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1 Introduction
Exporters’ life-cycle dynamics are important to understand the long-term and short-term
effects of economic shocks and trade policy changes. In consequence, they have been
extensively studied. However, exporting is only one possibility for firms to serve a foreign
market. Firms may also choose to become multinational enterprises (henceforth, MNEs).
Despite the overwhelming importance of these firms in the data, we know comparatively
little about the life-cycle dynamics of MNEs and their possible interaction with exporter
dynamics.1
This paper studies the life-cycle dynamics of exporters and MNEs. Using rich firm-level
data, we first provide a comprehensive set of facts on the life-cycle dynamics of new
exporters and new MNEs. We exploit data on domestic firms, exporters, and MNEs from
France and Norway and complement them with data on MNEs from Germany. First,
new exporters in a foreign market have two to three times higher exit rates than new
affiliates of MNEs in the same market. Second, average sales growth is similar for new
exporters and new MNEs. However, export growth profiles of exporters that switch to
serving the market as MNEs are steeper than those of exporters that do not switch to
MNE status. Finally, exit rates of exporters at age one exhibit gravity—they are strongly
correlated negatively with foreign market size and positively with distance—whereas
those of young MNE affiliates are uncorrelated with these foreign country characteristics.
In contrast, entry rates do not present stark differences in their gravity patterns between
the two groups. Our findings are strikingly very similar across the three economies under
study, despite their different size and structure.
Guided by the facts, we develop a dynamic model of trade and foreign direct investment
(FDI) based on the static model of the proximity-concentration trade-off in Helpman et al.
(2004, henceforth, HMY). We introduce dynamics into the model by assuming that firm
productivity evolves according to a Markov process and that MNE activities face a sunk
entry cost. The model preserves the ranking of the export and MNE choice from the static
model: The most productive firms become MNEs; firms with intermediate productivity
levels become exporters; and the least productive firms serve only their home market.
The sunk costs of MNE activities lead to a band of inaction, a range of productivity levels
where existing MNEs do not exit a market, but non-MNEs with the same productivity do
not enter. We show that our model is rich enough to qualitatively capture the facts we
document.
1 MNE affiliates’ global sales are twice as large as global exports, and they account for disproportionally
large shares of aggregate output and employment in many countries (Antrás and Yeaple, 2014).
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In the calibrated version of the model, we incorporate sunk export costs, as in the dynamic
model of exporting in Roberts and Tybout (1997), and assume that fixed and sunk costs
for both MNE and export activities are heterogenous at the firm-destination level. We
evaluate this quantitative version of the model in which Helpman et al. (2004) is coupled
with dynamics features of Roberts and Tybout (1997). Although we do not target the
life-cycle exit and growth profiles of exporters and MNEs, the calibrated model captures
quite well the patterns observed in the data.
Finally, we evaluate the predictions of our calibrated model with both exporters and
MNEs regarding life-cycle and aggregate dynamics after a hypothetical trade-liberalization
episode. We compare the predictions of our model with both exporters and MNEs to a
calibrated version of the model with only exporters. Enriching the canonical dynamic
model of trade to include MNEs—a first-order feature of the data—has consequences for
the life-cycle and aggregate dynamic behavior of exporters. One source of the different
responses of exporters between the two models hinges on the right truncation of fast-
growing exporters induced by the inclusion of the MNE choice. Without the MNE choice,
the most productive firms are exporters, as in the static model in Melitz (2003); with the
MNE choice, the most productive firms become MNEs, as in HMY. In a dynamic setup,
including the MNE choice not only truncates the exporters’ distribution of productivity
levels, but also induces a truncation to-the-right of the distribution of growth rates. The
fastest-growing exporters stop exporting and become MNEs when that option is allowed,
while the slowest-growing exporters remain exporters. Those exporters with the highest
productivity growth do not contribute to the average growth rate of exporters in the
model with MNEs—because they change status—but they do so in the model where the
MNE option is not included.2
Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, we contribute to the small, but
growing, literature that studies the joint behavior of exporters and MNEs using dynamic
models. Ramondo et al. (2013), Fillat and Garetto (2015), and Conconi et al. (2016), among
others, document and study different implications of the proximity-concentration trade-
off in dynamic setups. We present new evidence and study implications related to the
joint life-cycle behavior of exporters and MNEs.3
2 This mechanism hinges on the assumption that exporters that become MNE abandon exports to serve
a foreign market. We find that exports relative to total sales in a foreign destination decrease sharply after
MNE entry, consistent with the evidence documented by Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1998), Bloningen
(2001), and Head and Ries (2001), which use detailed firm- and product-level data.
3 Ramondo et al. (2013) include aggregate uncertainty into a two-period model of trade and FDI to
analyze how the properties of the international business cycle affect the choice of the entry mode into
foreign markets. Fillat and Garetto (2015) include aggregate uncertainty and sunk entry cost to study the
consequences for asset pricing. Conconi et al. (2016) include a learning mechanism to explain that most
firms enter foreign markets as exporters before opening an affiliate there. Early work by Rob and Vettas
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Second, we complement the extensive literature that studies exporters’ dynamics. Early
work by Baldwin (1989), Baldwin and Krugman (1989), and Dixit (1989), followed by
Roberts and Tybout (1997), Ghironi and Melitz (2005), Das et al. (2007), Alessandria and
Choi (2007), and Impullitti et al. (2013), point to the importance of the hysteresis created
by sunk investments for understanding the effects of temporary and permanent shocks
on aggregate trade flows and exchange rate movements. Our model combines elements
of this rich dynamic literature on exporters with the canonical model of trade and FDI in
Helpman et al. (2004).
Our paper is also closely related to Ruhl and Willis (2017) who document a set of life-
cycle dynamics facts for Colombian exporters. We document a similar (sub-)set of facts
for new French and Norwegian exporters, but also include life-cycle facts for MNEs. We
find, as they do, that matching the observed patterns of survival and growth of new
exporters requires very low sunk export costs, but this is not the case for MNEs. Whereas
they include demand-side frictions in the model to match the observed exit and growth
patterns, we include MNEs, a first-order feature of the data. We evaluate how far the
model goes in matching the data and whether the presence of MNEs changes the dynamic
behavior of exporters after a hypothetical trade-liberalization episode.4
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the data; Section 3 documents the
facts; Section 4 describes the model; Section 5 presents the calibration; Section 6 presents
the counterfactual exercises; and Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
Our empirical analysis is based on rich firm-level panel data sets from France, Norway,
and Germany. The French and the Norwegian data contain information on domestic
firms, exporters, and MNEs in varying levels of detail. In contrast, the German data
(2003) features demand uncertainty together with capacity constraints to study the mechanism behind the
choice of firms to simultaneously export to and maintain affiliates in the same market.
4 The literature on the life-cycle of domestic firms (summarized by Haltiwanger et al., 2013) and
exporters find that models with a AR(1) firm-level productivity process, as in Hopenhayn (1992), deliver
new firms that grow too large too quickly. Both literatures have resorted to demand frictions to slow down
firm growth (see Foster et al. (2016) for domestic firms). In relation to exporters’ growth driven by demand
factors, papers such as Albornoz et al. (2012), Eaton et al. (2014), and Morales et al. (2017), focus on the
dynamics of trade associated with learning. Arkolakis (2016) includes the cost of building a customer base
in a dynamic model of trade. Fitzgerald et al. (2017) evaluate the importance of demand-learning firm
growth versus customer-based firm growth to explain the life-cycle dynamics of firm export quantities
and export prices. Araujo et al. (2016) document that in markets with better contracting institutions new
exporters start bigger but grow slower (conditional on survival). They propose a framework in which
imperfect contract enforcement, together with imperfect information (and previous export experience in
other foreign markets) interact to match the observed pattern of exporter growth and survival.
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contain extremely detailed information on the foreign affiliates of German MNEs, but do
not provide any information on exporters and domestic firms. Our analysis exploits the
strengths of each of the three data sources, all of which cover a period of more than ten
years.
France. The data span the years 1999-2011 and combine information from several sources.
Information on a firm’s domestic sales is from FICUS (1999-2007) and FARE (2008-2011);
the export data are from the French customs; information on ownership links between
firms in France and between firms in France and abroad are from LiFi; and information
on foreign affiliate sales is from OFATs (2007, 2009-2011). We restrict the sample to firms
that are subject to the BRN-taxation regime and, for some of the analysis, to the sub-period
1999-2007.5
The data contain information on each firm’s domestic sales and export sales by destination,
as well as the location of foreign affiliates of French MNEs. Information on foreign affiliate
sales is available only for a subset of large MNEs and for some (non-consecutive) years.6
While affiliate sales are recorded annually, exports are recorded monthly. Following
Kleinert et al. (2015), we consolidate the information on domestic activities, exports and
foreign affiliates to the level of the French group (i.e., if firms A and B belong to firm C,
we consolidate all three firms). We keep a consolidated firm in the sample if at least one
of its domestic members is active in the manufacturing sector in at least one year.7 For
independent firms, we focus on those that operate in the manufacturing sector in at least
one year. Our sample contains only firms headquartered in France and excludes French
affiliates of foreign MNEs.
We consider MNE-country pairs and exporter-country pairs with multiple entry and
exit over the sample period.8 We restrict our attention to majority-owned affiliates of
French MNEs, which account for around 80 percent of all affiliates of French MNEs. We
aggregate both exports and FDI at the parent firm-foreign destination-year level. We end
up with a sample of 963,375 firm-year observations. The upper panel of Table E.1 shows
that 1.6 percent of firms in our sample are MNEs and 28.7 percent are non-MNE exporters.
5 The FICUS/FARE databases provide balance sheet data on virtually all French firms. The principal
data source is firms’ tax statements. The BRN regime applies to larger firms. We conducted our analysis
also including all firms. As small firms rarely export or conduct FDI, results are very similar. The period
restriction is made in order to avoid structural breaks in the time series, as both the industry classification
and the definition of the domestic sales variable changed in 2008.
6 OFATS is a survey of French MNEs with affiliates outside of the European Union. The sample is biased
towards large MNEs, as a comparison of domestic sales for MNEs in OFATs and the other sources reveals.
7 This consolidation implies that wholesale firms in France may be part of our sample, which is
important because large French groups often channel exports through wholesale affiliates.
8 Restricting the sample to MNE-country and exporter-country pairs with a single entry and exit over
the sample period yields very similar results.
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French MNEs account for almost 60 percent of employment in our sample, while non-
MNE exporters account for more than 30 percent. The median (mean) French MNE
operates in two (five) markets, with a handful of MNEs serving more than 81 markets,
while the median (mean) exporter serves four (ten) markets, with some exporters serving
more than 178 markets (top-coded to preserve confidentiality).
Norway. The data, which span the years 1996-2006, include information on each firm’s
domestic sales, as well as export and foreign affiliate sales by destination country. The
data nest balance sheet information on firms in the Norwegian manufacturing sector from
Statistics Norway’s Capital Database; information on exporters from customs declarations;
and data on firms’ foreign operations from the Directorate of Taxes’ Foreign Company
Report. The coverage is comprehensive: All foreign affiliates of Norwegian firms in the
manufacturing sector, as well as 90 percent of Norwegian manufacturing revenues, are
included; firms in the oil sector are excluded.
We consider MNE-country pairs and exporter-country pairs with multiple entry and
exit over the sample period. We include both majority- and minority-owned foreign
affiliates of Norwegian parents and adjust the affiliate sales by the parent’s ownership
share.9 Our sample consists of 89,018 firm-year observations. As the lower panel of
Table E.1 shows, only 1.5 percent of Norwegian firms have affiliates abroad, and 36.4
percent are non-MNE exporters. Norwegian MNEs represent more than 13 percent of
total manufacturing employment in Norway, while exporters represent 63 percent. The
median (mean) Norwegian MNE operates in two (four) markets, with a maximum at 37
markets, while the median (mean) exporter serves three (seven) markets, with a maximum
of 122 markets.
Germany. The data, which span the years 1999-2011, contain detailed balance sheet
information about foreign affiliates of German MNEs. The main data source is the Micro-
database Direct investment (MiDi, see Schild and Walter, 2015). Information about parent
firms is limited; for instance, it is not possible to distinguish between domestic and export
sales of the parent.
We consolidate the information on direct and indirect ownership shares and restrict our
attention to majority-owned affiliates, which represent 95 percent of foreign affiliates
of German MNEs, and affiliates whose parent operates in the manufacturing sector, or
whose parent is a holding company belonging to a corporate group in the manufacturing
sector, in at least one year.10We consolidate affiliates at the parent firm-foreign destination-
9 A 20 percent ownership threshold, not ten percent, is used to distinguish direct from portfolio
investment. The ownership shares considered for Norway are lower than the ones for France (20 versus 50
percent) in order to gain observations.
10 Reporting foreign investments to the German central bank is compulsory, but the reporting
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year level, and end up with a sample of 37,843 parent-year observations. Only 0.21
percent of German firms have affiliates abroad, but they account for 27 percent of total
sales in Germany (Buch et al., 2005). The median (mean) German MNE operates in one
(three) country(ies), with some parents operating in more than 27 markets (top-coded to
preserve confidentiality).
3 Facts on the life-cycle dynamics of exporters and MNEs
We document three novel facts about the life-cycle dynamics of MNEs and exporters.
First, we show life-cycle patterns of exit rates. Second, we present evidence on life-cycle
growth. Third, we document the relation between exit and entry rates across destination
markets and characteristics of those markets. Taken together, these facts are informative
about the features to be included in a dynamic model of exports and FDI— we explain
this connection in more detail below.
We study the behavior of new firms that start exporting to—or open an affiliate in—
a foreign country. We focus on the firm’s main mode of international operation and
distinguish between non-MNE exporters and MNEs. That is, only firms that are not
MNEs are considered exporters to a foreign destination, while firms with foreign operations
in a market are considered MNEs whether they export or not contemporaneously to the
same foreign destination. This distinction is motivated by the observation that FDI is
the dominant mode of serving the foreign market after MNE entry. Appendix Figure D.1
shows that the average export-to-foreign sales ratio decreases to around ten percent when
a firm opens an affiliate in a market, and that around ten percent of MNEs with exports
to that market before MNE entry completely discontinue exporting once they switch to
FDI.
Our facts are based on observations at the firm-destination-year level. For expositional
purposes, in the body of the paper, we present figures that show averages across the
destinations, weighted by each destination’s share of export (MNE) firms. Appendix
Table E.2 contains the results of Ordinary-Least- Squares (OLS) regressions that include a
battery of fixed effects and additional controls.
requirements change over time. We adjust the sample to unify thresholds: We include only affiliates with
either a participation of ten percent and revenues of at least ten million DM (Euro equivalent), or with
participation of at least 50 percent and revenues of at least three million Euro. We consolidate ownership
shares and restrict the sample to majority-owned affiliates only after unifying the reporting threshold.
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Figure 1: Exit rates by age.
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Notes: Number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number of firms active in a mode-market, by
mode-market-specific age, for exporters and MNEs. Observations are at the firm-destination-year level. We
show averages across destinations weighted by each destination’s share of export (MNE) firms. Exporters
refers to non-MNE exporters.
3.1 Exit rates
We first study the exit patterns of new exporters and new MNEs. We focus on exit from
the current mode of international operation and a foreign country.
Figure 1 plots the exit rates of exporters and MNEs at the firm-destination level by age.
Exit rates are calculated as the number of MNEs (exporters) that exit a given destination
relative to the number of active MNEs (exporters) in that destination at each age. Age
refers to the number of years after entry in a given market-mode, with age in the entry
year equal to zero. The figure presents averages across all firm-destination pairs.
On average, MNEs in a foreign market have between one third and one half of the exit
rates of exporters in the same foreign country in their first year of life. For both modes
of internationalization, exit rates are declining with age, though more drastically for
exporters. It is remarkable that results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar between
France and Norway.11
A formal test confirms that French exporters are around 15 percentage points more likely
to exit than foreign affiliates of French MNEs in the first two years after entry, but the
difference disappears later in life. For Norway, the difference in exit rates between exporters
11 Eaton et al. (2008) document similar exit rates for new Colombian exporters at the firm-destination
level. In unreported evidence, we find that the exit patterns of new MNEs from Germany are also
remarkably similar to the patterns found for French and Norwegian MNEs.
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Figure 2: Exit rates by age: experienced versus non-experienced MNEs.
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Notes: Number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number of firms active in a mode-market, by
mode-market-specific age. Experienced MNEs are new affiliates of MNEs that exported to a foreign market
for one or more years before opening an affiliate there. Observations are at the firm-destination-year level.
We show averages across destinations weighted by each destination’s share of MNE firms.
and MNEs is 30 percentage points at entry, but, after two years, the difference is not
statistically different from zero. This finding is summarized in Appendix Figure D.2.
It is reasonable to conjecture that having experienced a destination market as an exporter
before entering with an MNE affiliate has an effect on the chances of survival in that
market. We explore this evidence in Figure 2. We define "experienced MNE" an MNE
that exported to a given destination market in any year before opening a foreign affiliate
there.12 Experienced MNEs have an almost 10-percentage point lower exit rate, on average,
in the first year after entry than new affiliates without export experience. However, this
advantage disappears later in life (see also Appendix Figure D.3).
We conclude that:
Fact 1. New MNEs in a foreign destination have lower exit rates than new exporters in
that destination. MNEs with previous export experience in a market have lower exit rates
at entry than MNEs without that experience.
The large difference between exit rates of exporters and MNEs suggests the presence of
sunk costs of MNEs that are much larger than sunk costs of exporting. Additionally,
the co-existence of experienced and non-experienced MNEs supports a HMY-type model
with an AR(1) process for firm productivity.
Robustness. One may be concerned that the differences in exit rates documented in
12 Experienced MNEs represent almost 60 percent of new MNEs for France (47 percent for Norway).
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Figure 1 are not due to differences between the two modes of internationalization, but
that they are artifacts of definitions of age and exit. Firms may switch between modes
so that exporters become MNEs, and MNEs become exporters, for example. To exclude
such patterns from driving our results, we present two robustness results using the French
data. First, we recompute age as the number of years that the firm is active in a market,
regardless of its international mode of operation; that is, we compute market-specific,
rather than mode-market specific, age. Second, we redefine exit as complete exit from the
market rather than as exit from either exporting or MNE activities in a market. Baseline
results still hold, as columns 3 and 4 in Appendix Table E.2 show. Additionally, one may
be concerned that the entry mode of FDI plays a role: If MNEs enter a market through
Merger and Acquisition (M&A), they take over pre-existing domestic firms, whereas
Greenfield affiliates are, by definition, brand-new firms. Using the data from Germany,
Appendix Figure D.5a shows that there is no difference in exit rates between the two
modes of entry of foreign affiliates of German MNEs.13
3.2 Sales growth
Figure 3 shows the sales growth of exporters and MNE affiliates by age. We focus on firms
that survive for at least four years in a mode-market and demean the firm-destination
observations by industry, year, and destination fixed effects. We normalize sales with
respect to one-year after entry because the entry year may be contaminated, particularly
for exporters, by the so-called "partial-year effects"—artificially high first-year growth
rates due to firms that start operations in the middle of the calendar year (see Bernard
et al., 2017). Columns 5 and 6 in Appendix Table E.2 show the OLS results.
Figure 3 shows that foreign sales grow at similar rates for French exporters, Norwegian
exporters, and Norwegian MNEs, conditional on surviving for at least four years in the
market. Growth rates are markedly different only between age zero and age one, but as
outlined, this difference is likely attributable to partial-year effects.14
Lumping together exporters that eventually become MNE with the ones that never do
may mask substantial heterogeneity. Figure 4 shows that, in the French data, the group
13 In unreported results for France, we find that our baseline results are robust to: splitting the sample into
European Single Market (ESM) and non-ESM countries to address concerns about the different reporting
thresholds for exports to EU and non-EU members; using the unconsolidated rather than the consolidated
data; splitting the sample into the 1999-2005 and 2006-2011 periods; including cohort, rather than year,
fixed effects; and correcting for partial-year effects. Additionally, results at the firm level are very similar to
results at the firm-destination level.
14 Unreported evidence for Germany shows that sales profiles of German MNEs are quite similar to the
ones of Norwegian MNEs.
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Figure 3: Sales growth by age.
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Notes: Log of firm-destination export (affiliate) sales with respect to firm-destination export (affiliate) sales
in the year after entry. Firms with five or more years in the market. Observations are at the firm-destination-
year level. We show averages across destinations weighted by each destination’s share of export (MNE)
firms. Log of sales first demeaned by industry, year, and destination fixed effects. Exporters refers to non-
MNE exporters.
of exporters that switch to FDI to serve a given market ("ever-MNE" exporters) clearly
grow faster, in terms of exports, in the years previous to MNE entry, than the exporters
that never become MNE ("never-MNE" exporters). In the Norwegian data, the difference
is less marked, but the number of observations also decreases substantially.
We conclude that:
Fact 2. Average life-cycle sales growth is similar for exporters and MNEs. However, ever-
MNE exporters grow, on average, much faster before MNE entry than do never-MNE
exporters.
The similarity of export and affiliate sales growth suggests that productivity evolves in a
similar way for exporters, parents and affiliates of MNEs. The higher export sales growth
of ever-MNEs than never-MNEs supports a strong role for self-selection of firms into the
different modes of internationalization, as in HMY.
Robustness. One may be concerned that normalizing sales growth by the year after
entry is not sufficient to adequately account for partial-year effects. As the French data
contain monthly export sales, we can correct for partial-year effects by calculating 12-
month growth rates (as also done by Bernard et al. 2017). A comparison of columns 5 and
10
Figure 4: Exporters’ sales growth by age and type.
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Notes: Log of firm-destination export sales with respect to firm-destination export sales in the year after export
entry, for firms with five or more years in the market as exporters. Observations are at the firm-destination-
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7 in Appendix Table E.2 confirms that the entry year does seem contaminated by these
effects: Growth at age one is much higher for the calendar-year data than for the adjusted
data; for subsequent ages, growth rates are quite similar, which supports the age-one
normalization in Figure 3.
To document the selection induced by non-random survival, Appendix Figure D.4 shows
growth profiles by tenure in the market. As expected, firms that survive longer grow
faster. The differences are less pronounced for MNEs, but for all tenure lengths, exports
from age one onwards grow at a similar rates as MNE sales.
Finally, one may be rightly concerned that sales growth rates of new MNEs differ between
new MNE affiliates that enter the market through M&A versus Greenfield FDI. One may
expect that, as brand-new firms, affiliates created through Greenfield FDI grow faster than
affiliates created through M&As, which are older.15 Using the German data, Appendix
Figure D.5b shows that, as expected, MNEs that enter through M&A grow less than MNEs
that enter a market with a Greenfield project. Nonetheless, the differences are not large if
one disregards the entry year, again supporting our normalization choice in Figure 3.
15 Part of the higher growth rate may be due to partial-year-effects for MNEs because some affiliates may
not start operating in January, but later in the year.
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3.3 Entry, exit, and gravity
The previous two facts pool firms across different destination countries. Country characteristics,
however, may be an important determinant of a firm’s development over its life-cycle.
To explore this issue, we study the correlation between first-year exit rates and entry
rates of exporters and MNEs, and two country characteristics that are prominent in the
international trade literature: the size of the destination country, as measured by GDP;
and the distance of the destination country from the firm’s home country. Our finding is
that:
Fact 3. First-year exit rates of exporters exhibit gravity, whereas those of MNEs do not.
Both entry rates for exporters and MNEs exhibit gravity.
Figure 5 shows scatter plots of first-year exit rates against market size (upper panels),
and distance (lower panel), for France. We restrict the sample to countries with at least
ten firm-destination observations. We relegate results for Norway, which are extremely
similar, to Appendix Figure D.6.
The cross-country patterns of first-year exit between the two modes of international operation
are strikingly different: While exporters operating in smaller and more distant markets
are more likely to stop operations right after entry, it is not clear that affiliates of MNEs
do.16 An OLS regression shows that the exit probability increases by almost seven percentage
points when distance doubles, and it decreases by 3.4 percentage points when GDP doubles,
with both coefficients significant at the one percent level. In contrast, the effects of GDP
and distance on the exit rates of MNE affiliates are insignificant.
Figure 6 shows the same scatter plots for the entry rates. Unlike the exit rates, both
entry rates for exporters and MNEs are correlated with country characteristics. In OLS
regressions, we find that the elasticities with respect to market size are quite similar for
exporters and MNEs, but the distance elasticities are three times as large for exporters.17
Appendix Figure D.7 shows that, for Norway, distance elasticities are also higher for
exporter entry than for MNE entry and market size elasticities are similar across the two
entry modes.
The difference of first-year exit rates between exporters and MNEs suggests that higher
sunk costs of entry for exporters than for MNEs. This fact is thus key in informing
16 Using data from Argentina, Albornoz et al. (2016) document a similar pattern for exporters: survival
probabilities decrease with distance. They rationalize this finding with a model where sunk export costs
increase with distance proportionally less than do fixed costs.
17 The elasticities with respect to market size are 0.52 (s.e. 0.027) and 0.41 (s.e. 0.033) for exporters and
MNEs, respectively; distance elasticities are -1.15 (s.e. 0.105) vs -0.36 (s.e. 0.094).
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Figure 5: First-year exit rates and market characteristics, France.
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(d) MNEs
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Notes: Number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number of firms active in a mode-market, for
exporters and MNEs, in the first year upon mode-market entry (i.e., age zero). Destinations with ten or more
firm-year observations and with available GDP data. Exporters refers to non-MNE exporters. GDP data from
International Financial Statistics (IMF). Distance data from CEPII (Mayer and Zignago, 2011).
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Figure 6: Entry rates and market characteristics, France.
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Notes: Number of entries to a mode-market relative to the number of domestic firms active in the home
market. Destinations with ten or more firm-year observations and with available GDP data. Exporters
refers to non-MNE exporters. GDP data from International Financial Statistics (IMF). Distance data from CEPII
(Mayer and Zignago, 2011).
dynamic models of exporters and MNEs. The patterns observed for entry rates suggest
that exporters face distance-dependent trade costs, whereas MNEs do not, consistent with
the proximity-concentration-trade off in HMY. A static model thus suffices to capture this
fact.
Robustness. Exporters and MNEs are active in different countries: Firms penetrate many
more countries as exporters than as MNEs. To exclude that the difference in country
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coverage drives the results, we replicate our analysis for only those countries with both
exporting and multinational activity, for France. Both the pattern of first-year exit and
entry rates for exporters are less pronounced than in the full sample, but still clearly
correlated with country characteristics.18 For MNEs, results are unchanged.
4 A dynamic model of exports and MNEs
Guided by the facts documented in the previous section, we build a dynamic model of
export and MNE activities that is based on the model of the proximity-concentration
trade-off with heterogeneous firms in HMY, extended to include an autoregressive process
for firm productivity and sunk costs for MNE activities. We construct a model of "horizontal"
FDI, i.e., affiliate sales are destined to the host market only. For simplicity, export-platforms,
i.e., locating production in market l and serving a third market n through exports from
l, and intrafirm trade are excluded.19 We focus on horizontal FDI instead of vertical FDI
as the prior literature has found horizontal FDI to be the main form of FDI activity (see
Ramondo et al., 2016).
4.1 Set up
We build a partial equilibrium model with two countries, Home and Foreign. Time
is discrete. Labor is the only factor of production and is supplied in fixed quantity.
The wage in each country is pinned down by a constant-return-to-scale freely tradable
homogeneous good sector, and normalized to one, w = 1.
Goods that are exported to the foreign country are subject to an iceberg-type trade cost,
τ ≥ 1, while production in foreign affiliates is subject to an efficiency loss given by γ ≥ 1,
with τ > γ, consistent with the empirical evidence (Antrás and Yeaple, 2014). A firm
that exports incurs a per-period fixed cost, fx, and a firm that operates an affiliate in the
foreign country incurs a per-period fixed cost fm, with fm/fx > (γ/τ)σ−1, as in HMY.
Firms that decide to open an affiliate have to pay a sunk cost, Fm > 0, at the time of MNE
entry. Fixed and sunk costs are paid in units of labor.
A firm is characterized by a core efficiency level, φ ≡ exp(z), that evolves over time
18 Export exit elasticities with respect to GDP and distance are -0.023 (s.e. 0.003) and 0.046 (s.e. 0.005),
while entry elasticities with respect to the same variables are 0.23 (s.e. 0.026) and -0.53 (s.e. 0.112).
19 See Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) and Tintelnot (2017) for recent models of export-platform
FDI.
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following a first-order autoregressive AR(1) process,
z′ = ρz + σεε
′,
where 0 ≤ ρ < 1 and ε′ ∼ N(0, 1). If a firm from the Home country opens an affiliate in
the Foreign country, that affiliate inherits its parent’s productivity process.
There exists a continuum of firms that compete monopolistically, and have access to a
continuum of differentiated products. The mass of Home firms,M , is fixed and normalized
to one. We assume Constant-Elasticity-of-Substitution (CES) preferences, with the elasticity
of substitution denoted by σ. Firms optimally charge a constant mark-up, κ ≡ σ/(σ − 1),
over marginal costs, so that sales follow the standard CES formula. Let E ≡ κ1−σX/P 1−σ
be foreign demand. We assume that the firms from the home country account only for
a small fraction of the overall sales in the foreign country, so that the price index in the
foreign country is taken as fixed. We normalize Ehome = 1 so that E is the size of Foreign
relative to Home.
Static profit maximization implies that domestic sales are given by Xd(φ) = φσ−1, while
exports from Home are Xx(φ) = Eφσ−1τ 1−σ, and affiliate sales in Foreign are Xm(φ) =
Eφσ−1γ1−σ.
Firms have two possible states: producing in the home market for domestic consumers
only and, potentially, for foreign consumers (D); or producing in the home market for
domestic consumers and in the foreign market for foreign consumers (M). The value of
being a multinational firm with core productivity φ is given by
V (φ,M) =
Xd(φ)
σ
+ max
{
Xm(φ)
σ
− fm + βEV (φ′,M | φ),
max(0,
Xx(φ)
σ
− fx) +βEV (φ′, D | φ)} ; (1)
and the value of being a domestic firm with core productivity φ is given by
V (φ,D) =
Xd(φ)
σ
+ max
{
Xm(φ)
σ
− fm − Fme + βEV (φ′,M | φ),
max(0,
Xx(φ)
σ
− fx) +βEV (φ′, D | φ)} . (2)
The optimal policy for an MNE is to discontinue the foreign investment if being domestic
(state D) entails larger discounted expected profits than being MNE (state M). This policy
is characterized by a cutoff value of productivity φ̄m. If productivity falls below φ̄m, a
current MNE exits the foreign market and produces only in the domestic market. If
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productivity exceeds φ̄m, the firm remains an MNE (state M). Similarly, the optimal policy
for a domestic firm is characterized by a productivity cutoff level, φ̄me . Once the productivity
level of the domestic firm exceeds φ̄me , it becomes an MNE. It is possible to rank the two
productivity cut-offs: Since the second terms in the outer maximization problem in (1)
and (2), respectively, are identical, and Xm and V are increasing in φ, as the expectation
operator preserves monotonicity, it follows that φ̄m < φ̄me . This implies that the model
delivers an "inaction" zone that exists by virtue of the sunk cost of doing FDI (Baldwin,
1989). Domestic firms with productivity φ ∈ [φ̄m, φ̄me ] remain domestic, while MNEs with
productivity φ ∈ [φ̄m, φ̄me ] remain MNEs. The inaction zone, thus, creates persistence in
the MNE status.
Without sunk MNE costs, it suffices to have fm/fx > (γ/τ)1−σ for MNEs to have a higher
exit cutoff than exporters, φ̄m > φ̄x. With sunk MNE costs, that assumption is not enough.
We proceed by assuming that the MNE exit cutoff is higher than the exporter exit cutoff.20
4.2 Model predictions
We now explain how the model captures the facts documented in Section 3.
The model can capture Fact 1 under some conditions. The "inaction" zone created by the
presence of sunk and fixed costs makes MNEs less likely to exit than in a setup with no
sunk costs. That exit rates for MNEs are lower than for exporters—and by how much—
depends on the values of the model’s parameters. Proposition 1 states the result.
Proposition 1. Let the entry cut-off for MNEs ln(φ̄me ) = z̄me and the entry and exit cut-off
for exports ln(φ̄x) = z̄x relate as z̄me = z̄x + ϕ, with ϕ > 0. There exists ϕ∗ such that for
0 ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗, the exit probability upon entry is higher for an exporter than for an MNE
with identical productivity before exit.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The effect of export experience on the exit probability of an MNE is driven by selection
on productivity, as Proposition 2 shows.
Proposition 2. The probability that a new MNE exits upon entry is lower if the firm
switched from export to MNE activity than from domestic to MNE activity.
20 The assumption that φ̄m > φ̄x is implicit in the way we wrote the value functions: It rules out that, for
the marginal MNE, the value of producing at home for the domestic market only is higher than the value
of producing at home for the domestic and foreign market. In our calibrations and simulations below, this
ranking of cutoffs is never violated.
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Proof. See Appendix B.2.
All new MNEs have received a sufficiently good productivity shock that induces them
to enter a market as MNEs. As exporters are more productive than domestic firms, firms
with export experience enter MNE status with a productivity level that is higher than that
of a firm with no export experience. Given that productivity follows a Markov process
with log-normal distributed shocks, and the exit cutoffs are the same for MNEs with
and without export experience, more productive firms at the time of entry are less likely
to have a productivity draw that falls below the exit cutoff in the subsequent period.
Proposition 2 is for the case of positive sunk costs of MNE entry, but the result also holds
in the case of no sunk MNE costs.
Both exporters and MNEs follow the same productivity process in the model. However,
this does not automatically lead to the similar sales growth rates of exporters and MNEs
documented in Fact 2. The selection patterns that arise from the inclusion of fixed and
sunk costs have subtle effects on the growth rates. Ultimately, how well the model can
capture the similarity of exporter and MNE growth rates remains a quantitative question,
which we address in Section 5. Self-selection of firms also drives the higher sales growth
of ever-MNE exporters relative to never-MNE exporters.
Finally, the inclusion of sunk MNE costs allows the model to capture Fact 3: First-year
exit rates of new exporters are correlated with country characteristics, while for MNEs,
they are not. The following proposition shows the result.
Proposition 3. Let z̄ be the productivity exit cutoff from a mode of international operation.
The increase in the first-year exit probability when z̄ increases is larger when sunk costs
of entry into the mode are zero than when sunk costs are positive.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Because of MNE sunk costs, the productivity level required for MNE entry exceeds the
productivity level for MNE exit, φ̄me > φ̄m. The higher the sunk costs, Fm, the higher the
option value of being an MNE and, hence, the larger the zone of inaction and the less
sensitive the exit behavior to differences in variable profits.21
An important implication of the model is that new exporters in an environment without
the option to become MNE have different life-cycle properties than in an environment
where they can self-select into MNE activities. Intuitively, including the MNE choice
21 In an export-only model, Albornoz et al. (2016) show that the probability of export survival in a
market increases with the ratio of sunk to fixed costs. While their result is about how export survival
rates change with sunk costs, our Proposition 3 states a difference-in-difference result: How the survival—
or, equivalently, exit—probability changes due to a change of market characteristics, for different levels of
sunk costs.
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not only truncates the exporters’ distribution of productivity levels, but also induces a
truncation to-the-right of the distribution of productivity growth rates. Only firms with
productivity above the export, but below the MNE threshold in two consecutive periods
contribute to export productivity (and sales) growth. For each z ∈ [φ̄x, φ̄m], there is a
maximum possible increase in productivity such that an exporter remains an exporter.
Exporters that receive a higher productivity shock turn into MNEs when the MNE choice
is allowed. Those exporters with the highest productivity shocks and, thus, the highest
sales growth, do not contribute to the average growth rate of exporters in the model
with MNEs (because they change status), but they do it in the model without MNEs. In
turn, because the maximum possible growth in productivity decreases with productivity
levels, smaller exporters are the ones contributing to average productivity in the model
without MNEs, but not in the model with MNEs (because they switch status). As a
consequence, exporters in the model for which the MNE option is present have higher
average productivity early in life and, hence, lower exit rates.
Proposition 4 derives this result formally for the marginal exporter.22
Proposition 4. Assume that firm productivity follows a first-order autoregressive process,
zt = ρzt−1 + σεεt, with εt ∼ N(0, 1), and 0 ≤ ρ < 1, and assume that sunk costs of
MNE entry are zero, Fm = 0. Consider the firm with zt−1 = z and zt > z, where z
denotes the productivity threshold above which firms become exporters. Define expected
productivity growth in a model with only left truncation in the productivity distribution
as GL ≡ E (zt − zt−1 | zt > z, zt−1 = z), while in a model with left and right truncation,
expected productivity growth is defined as GLR ≡ E (zt − zt−1 | z < zt < z̄, zt−1 = z), with
z̄ denoting the right truncation point above which the firm changes from export to MNE
status. Then, there exists a value z̄∗ ∈ (z,∞) such that for z < z̄ < z̄∗, GL > GLR, with
equality for z̄ = z̄∗.
Proof. See Appendix B.
We quantitatively explore the effect of including the option to become MNE by comparing
calibrated versions of the model with MNEs and with only exporters in Section 6.
5 Calibration
We calibrate the model and analyze how well the calibrated model quantitatively captures
the patterns observed in the data. We extend the model in Section 4 to include sunk
22 In Appendix A.1, we show that the growth rate for the average exporter can be lower in the model
with MNEs for certain parameters’ values.
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export costs and assume that both fixed and sunk export and MNE costs are firm-specific.
Appendix C presents the main equations of the extended model.
Our goal is to parameterize the extended model by targeting cross-sectional features
of the data, as well as the dynamics of domestic sales, and then assess how well our
calibrated model accounts for new affiliate and exporter dynamics as reflected in the facts
in Section 3. We perform two calibrations using moments from France and Norway to
calibrate the parameters of the model. We present the calibration not only for France, but
also for Norway because the information on MNE sales in the French data is very limited.
We use the top 15 destination markets for exports and MNEs, plus a sixteenth country
constructed as a weighted average of the rest of the world (RoW). The top 15 destinations
represent more than 75 percent of export and MNE sales.23
For each destination, we calibrate the values of the iceberg trade and MNE costs, the mean
and variance of the per-period export and MNE fixed costs, the mean and variance of the
sunk costs of MNE and export entry, and the relative market size. Consistent with the
model presented in the previous section, we abstract away from export-platforms sales,
so that entry into each destination country can be solved independently. As in the model,
we restrict the analysis to a partial equilibrium setting in which wages and price indices
are exogenous.
5.1 Calibration procedure
We set the discount factor for firms β = 0.95, which is consistent with an interest rate of
five percent. The elasticity of substitution σ is set to 4, which implies a mark-up over unit
cost of 33 percent and is a common value estimated for the trade elasticity.
A first set of parameters can be calibrated without solving for the firm’s problem. Given
σ, we use the ratio of export to domestic sales, rxn ≡ (Xxn(φ)/Xd(φ))
1
1−σ = Enτ
1−σ
n , for
firms serving market n, to get an estimate of size-adjusted trade costs for market n.
Analogously, we use the ratio of MNE to domestic sales, rmn ≡ (Xmn (φ)/Xd(φ))
1
1−σ =
Enγ
1−σ
n , for MNE affiliates operating in market n, to get an estimate of size-adjusted MNE
costs for market n.24 We calculate rxn and rmn , respectively, as a weighted average across
firms serving market n in each mode, with weights given by the firm’s domestic sales.
23 In the French data, it is not possible to distinguish exports to Belgium from exports to Luxembourg.
Therefore, we aggregate Belgium-Luxembourg and the Netherlands into one country (Benelux). Due to its
increasing importance, we add China to the list of foreign destination for France.
24 In order to gain observations, for some destinations of French MNEs, we impute missing MNE sales
using as covariates (log) domestic sales, (log) domestic employment, an interaction of the two previous
variables, year and sector fixed effects, for firms surviving at least five years in a foreign destination.
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For exports, we restrict attention to firms that served market n at least three years in a
row. For MNEs, we do not limit the number of years in a market (given the low number
of observations on sales for France). Appendix Table E.3 shows the values for rxn and rmn ,
for each destination market.
The parameters characterizing the Markov process for firm-level productivity, ρ and σε,
come from estimating by OLS a first-order autoregressive process on domestic sales, using
all French and Norwegian firms (i.e., unbalanced panel). The regression includes year
and industry fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the industry level. With these
estimates, we directly set ρ equal to the estimated sales autocorrelation coefficient, ρ̂sales,
and σε equal to σ̂sales/(σ− 1). For France, ρ = 0.960 and σε = 0.197, while for Norway, our
estimates imply that ρ = 0.957 and σε = 0.133.25
The remaining parameters of the model are jointly calibrated, for each market. We assume
that sunk (fixed) costs are drawn from a log-normal distribution, are constant for each
firm over time, and are independent from firm productivity. The relevant market-specific
sunk and fixed cost parameters are: the mean and standard deviation of sunk export
costs, µxen and σxen; the mean and variance of sunk MNE costs, µmen and σmen; the mean of
per-period export costs, µxfn; and the mean of per-period MNE costs, µ
m
fn. We pin down
σmfn and σ
x
fn by assuming the coefficient of variation in sunk and fixed cost draws for
each mode is the same, i.e., |σsen/µsen| = |σsfn/µsfn| (s ∈ x,m). We target the following
six moments, for each market: the fraction of non-MNE French (Norwegian) exporters
serving market n, relative to French (Norwegian) firms that do not serve market n with
exports (which includes non-exporter firms and exporters to other destinations); the fraction
of French (Norwegian) MNEs serving market n, relative to French (Norwegian) firms
that do not serve market n with an affiliate (which includes non-MNE firms and MNEs to
other destinations); the share of French (Norwegian) MNEs that exit at age zero (i.e., entry
year) market n, relative to MNE stayers in market n; the share of French (Norwegian)
exporters that exit at age zero (i.e., entry year) market n, relative to exporter stayers in
market n; the average share of French (Norwegian) MNEs that exit market n, relative to
MNE stayers in market n; and the average share of French (Norwegian) exporters that
exit market n, relative to exporter stayers in market n. Appendix Tables E.4 and E.5
show targeted moments in the model and data, an average across destinations and by
destination. Appendix Table E.6 presents the calibrated parameters by destination.
Results below are calculated from model and data observations at the firm-destination-
year level. As for the facts in Section 3, for expositional purposes, we present averages
across the destinations included in our samples, weighted by each destination’s share of
25 Results are very similar if we estimate a Tobit model rather than a linear model.
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Table 1: The size of calibrated costs.
Norway France
fxn f
m
n F
x
n F
m
n f
x
n f
m
n F
x
n F
m
n
Values as % of sales
25th sales pc 21.7 18.7 0.005 12.7 21.6 14.0 0.004 5.2
50th sales pc 17.8 15.0 0.004 10.2 17.5 10.3 0.003 3.9
75th sales pc 13.0 10.8 0.003 7.3 12.1 6.3 0.002 2.3
90th sales pc 8.9 7.2 0.002 4.9 7.5 3.4 0.001 1.3
Values in U.S. dollars
25th sales pc 1,206 389,389 0.3 263,870 2,683 651,572* 0.5 243,165*
50th sales pc 5,998 1,087,432 1.5 736,898 12,373 1,573,420* 2.2 587,196*
75th sales pc 29,755 2,826,765 7.4 1,915,558 47,249 2,810,340* 8.4 1,048,811*
90th sales pc 1,022,070 6,491,723 25.5 4,399,116 136,755 4,878,970* 24.4 1,820,817*
Notes: fxn are per-period fixed export costs; fmn are per-period fixed MNE costs; F xn are sunk export costs;
and Fmn are sunk MNE costs. Values are averages across firms’ draws, conditional on a positive measure
of exporters (MNEs), in each destination. Averages across destinations included in the calibration, weighted
by each destination’s share of export (MNE) firms. Weights are data-based (model-based), for data (model)
variables. Sales percentiles are with respect to the export (MNE) sales distribution. The values in U.S. dollars
for different percentiles are calculated using the values of sales in the data, transformed to U.S. dollars using
an average of the annual exchange rate observed over our sample period, from Penn World Tables 9.0 (Feenstra
et al., 2015). (*) estimated values assuming that the xth pc of the MNE sales distribution is proportional to the
xth pc of the export sales distribution, with the proportionality factor calculated using the ratio of export to MNE
sales for each percentile, for Norway.
export (MNE) firms, relative to all export (MNE) firms in our sample. The Appendix
contains the results by destination.
5.2 Calibration results
We evaluate the size of the calibrated per-period fixed costs and sunk entry costs, for
exports and MNE activities, in terms of one year of firm sales, and in monetary values.
Table 1 presents the results.
Sunk costs, particularly for exports, do not seem to be a heavy burden on firms deciding
to internationalize. For MNEs, sunk costs represent around ten percent of annual sales
for smaller firms and around five percent for larger firms, according to our calibration
for Norway. For French MNEs, our calibration suggests that these sunk costs, in terms
of sales, are half those faced by Norwegian MNEs. In monetary terms, for Norwegian
MNEs, sunk costs range from less than 300,000 to almost 4.5 million U.S. dollars. In
contrast, the calibrated sunk export costs are very small, around 0.2-0.5 percent of annual
export sales.
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Fixed operating costs, however, are relatively much larger. Fixed costs represent around
nine percent of foreign sales for large Norwegian exporters and reach more than 20 percent
for small exporters; per-period MNEs costs are slightly lower in terms of sales. Our
calibrated values for French exporters and MNEs entail slightly lower per-period costs, in
terms of annual sales, than for Norwegian firms. In monetary terms, given the difference
in size between MNEs and exporters, per-period fixed costs for exporters are around one
million U.S. dollars for the 90th percentile of Norwegian exporters, but reach almost 6.5
million U.S. dollars for the largest Norwegian MNEs. Appendix Table E.7 presents results
by destination market for the median exporter (MNE) in terms of sales in each destination.
5.3 Fit of calibrated model
We now evaluate how well our calibrated model captures the facts in Section 3. We start
by comparing the exit rates of new exporters and MNEs in the data and the model. Our
calibration procedure targets exit rates of MNEs and exporters at entry and on average,
but not at each age. Figure 7 shows that our calibrated model does fairly well in capturing
the life-cycle dynamics of exit for new MNEs and new exporters. Even though the first-
year exit rate is a targeted moment, the model underestimates how much exit is observed
upon entry into a market, particularly for exporters. But the quantitative model captures
well the decline in exit rates with age. Targeting the first-year exit rate is crucial to obtain
this decline; when this moment is not included in the calibration, exit rates increase, rather
than decrease, with age.26
Figure 8 shows the ability of the model to capture the growth profiles of MNE and export
sales. We compute the geometric average across destination markets and normalize sales
with respect to age one (i.e., one year after entry). The model matches the flat sales profile
for MNEs remarkably well, as well as the growth profile of export sales, for Norway. The
model calibrated to France, however, delivers exporters that, after age one, grow faster
than in the data.
To evaluate the model’s ability to quantitatively capture Fact 3 in Section 3, we estimate
by OLS the elasticity of exit rates at age zero and entry rates, for exporters and MNEs,
on geography-adjusted country size, rxn ≡ Enτ 1−σn (rmn ≡ Enγ1−σn ), across the destinations
included in our calibration, for Norway and France. We use the observed and simulated
26 This is also the case in Ruhl and Willis (2017) (see their Figure 2b and 3b): When they target first-year
exit rates for exporters, they obtain exit rates that decline with age; when they only target the average exit
rate, they obtain exit rates that increase with age.
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Figure 7: Exit rates by age, model and data.
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(d) MNEs
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Notes: Number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number of firms active in a mode-market, by
mode-market-specific age, for exporters and MNEs. Observations are at the firm-destination-year level.
We show averages across destinations included in the calibration, weighted by each destination’s share of
export (MNE) firms. Weights are data-based and model-based, for data and model variables, respectively.
Exporters in the data refers to non-MNE exporters.
data. Results are presented in the first two panels of Table 2. One has to keep in mind
that these regressions have only 16 observations. Still, the model delivers sharper results
for exporters exit rates than for MNEs, as the theory predicts and our third fact shows:
New exporters’ exit rates decrease with size-adjusted iceberg cots, while new MNEs’ exit
rates do not have a clear pattern. The model’s implied entry rates elasticities are larger
for MNEs than for exporters as observed in the data, but the model difference between
the two is smaller.
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Figure 8: Sales growth by age, model and data.
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(b) Exporters, Norway
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(c) MNEs, Norway
-.6
-.5
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
Lo
g 
sa
le
s,
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 y
ea
r a
fte
r e
nt
ry
0 1 2 3 4
Mode-market-specific age
MNEs, data
MNEs, model
Notes: Log of firm-destination export (affiliate) sales with respect to firm-destination export (affiliate) sales in
the year after entry, for firms with five or more years in the market, in each mode. Observations are at the
firm-destination-year level. We show averages across destinations included in the calibration, weighted by each
destination’s share of export (MNE) firms. Weights are data-based and model-based, for data and model variables,
respectively. In the data, log of sales are first demeaned by industry, year, and destination fixed effects. Exporters in
the data refers to non-MNE exporters.
Table 2 includes comparisons for other non-targeted moments. Panel 3 shows that the
calibrated model correctly captures the fact that new experienced MNEs have lower exit
rates than non-experienced MNEs. Yet, the calibrated model delivers virtually zero new
MNEs that were not previously exporters. Additionally, starter rates in the model are
fairly closed to the ones observed in the French data. The model also captures rather
accurately the transitions from/to export and domestic status, and from/to MNE and
domestic status. But the model over-predicts the transition from/to MNE and export
status: Too many exporters become MNEs, and too many MNEs transition into only
exporters.
5.4 Model calibration with only exporters
The goal of our counterfactual exercises is to assess whether the option to become MNE
changes the predictions of the standard export dynamics model under a trade-liberalization
shock. Before turning to the counterfactual exercises, we therefore compare the goodness
of fit of our calibrated model with MNEs to a calibrated model with only exporters.
The calibration of the exporter-only model targets exactly the same moments related to
exporters as our calibration of the model with MNEs — in particular, the parametrization
of the productivity process is the same.27
27 The calibrated model with only exporters matches the export-related targeted and non-targeted
moments equally well as the model with MNEs (not shown). Appendix Table E.6 shows the calibrated
values of per-period and sunk export costs for the model without MNEs.
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Table 2: Additional non-targeted moments, data and model.
Data Model
France Norway France Norway
Elasticity of first-year exit rates to size-adjusted iceberg costs, OLS
exporters -0.057** -0.016 -0.028*** -0.033
MNEs 0.035 0.062 0.079 0.047
Elasticity of entry rates to size-adjusted iceberg costs, OLS
exporters 0.143*** 0.226 0.253*** 0.843***
MNEs 0.554*** 0.237** 0.414*** 0.212
Share of experienced MNEs 0.60 0.47 0.99 0.99
Exit rates at age zero, experienced MNEs 0.21 0.16 0.24 0.15
Exit rates at age zero, non-experienced MNEs 0.29 0.21 0.29 0.19
Starter rate
exporters 0.020 0.035 0.019 0.019
MNEs 5.4e-04 5.0e-04 0.002 0.001
Probability of:
exporter to MNE 0.003 0.002 0.017 0.013
exporter to domestic 0.188 0.275 0.237 0.239
domestic to MNE 1.8e-04 9.4e-05 2.0e-04 1.4e-06
domestic to exporter 0.019 0.038 0.018 0.019
MNE to exporter 0.059 0.069 0.142 0.110
MNE to domestic 0.043 0.057 0.052 0.058
Notes: The elasticity of first-year exit rates (entry rates) to size-adjusted iceberg costs (rxn and rmn , for exporters
and MNEs, respectively) is the OLS coefficient of a bivariate regression (with a constant), using the 16 countries
included in the calibration, for France and Norway. The fraction of experienced MNEs is calculated as the
number of new MNEs of age zero with previous export experience in a market, relative to all new MNEs of
age zero entering that market. Starter rates for exporters are calculated as the number of firms that export to
j in t, but not in t − 1, relative to the number of Home firms at t − 1. Starter rates for MNEs are calculated
as the number of MNEs that have an affiliate j in t, but not in t − 1, relative to the number of Home firms at
t− 1. The transition probabilities are calculated for all firms, a weighted average across destinations: exporter to
MNE (domestic) is relative to the number of non-MNE exporters; domestic to MNE (exporter) is relative to the
number of domestic firms; and MNE to exporter (domestic) is relative to the number of MNEs. Observations
are at the firm-destination-year level. Averages across destinations included in the calibration are weighted by
each destination’s share of export (MNE) firms, except for starter rates, and transitions from domestic status,
which are weighted by (the inverse of) the number of destinations. Weights are data-based (model-based) for
data (model) variables. Exporters in the data refers to non-MNE exporters. Levels of significance denoted by ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Appendix Figure D.10a compares exit rates for exporters, averaged across destination
markets, in the data and in the calibrated model with and without MNEs, for France.
While the model with MNEs does slightly better in matching exit of young exporters, the
model with only exporters does better for older exporter.28 In contrast with the results
in Ruhl and Willis (2017), both our calibrated models feature a monotonic decrease in
exit rates with age. This is entirely driven by targeting first-year exit rates. This moment
is responsible for calibrated sunk export costs that are close to zero, and hence, for an
extremely small band of inaction for exporters.
Appendix Figure D.10b shows that the model with MNEs produces sales profiles for
exporters that are slightly flatter (three percentage-points lower) and closer to the data
than the model with only exporters.29 This finding reflects the result that a model with
left and right truncation can yield exporters that grow more slowly than exporters in a
model with only left truncation. Yet, demand-side frictions, as the ones considered by
Arkolakis (2016) and Ruhl and Willis (2017) would be needed to fully match the data on
new exporters’ growth.
As we described in Section 4, at the core of the model’s mechanism is the self-selection
of fast-growing exporters into MNE activities. Appendix Figure D.11 compares growth
profiles for ever-MNE and never-MNE exporters in the two models and the data. This
figure reveals that the difference in growth rates between the two models is mainly due
to the never-MNE exporters. The model with MNEs predicts better the growth profile of
new exporters that never switch to MNE status—the bulk of exporters in the data. The
two models perform similarly well in capturing the observed dynamics of exporters that
later in life become MNEs.
In the next section, we turn to the effects of trade liberalization episodes on aggregate and
life-cycle dynamics of exporters and MNEs. We compare the predictions of the model
with MNEs to the predictions of the model with only exporters.
6 The effects of trade liberalization
Armed with the calibrated model, we analyze the effects of trade liberalization on aggregate
dynamics and life-cycle dynamics of MNEs and exporters. For exporters, we further show
the effects predicted by the calibrated model without MNEs. Even though the differences
between the calibrated model with and without MNEs in fitting the data are not very
28 Appendix Figure D.8 shows results by destination.
29 Differences become more pronounced when one considers exporters that survive longer in the market
(not shown).
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large, the two models can deliver different predictions regarding counterfactual exercises.
We simulate a 20-percent change in the iceberg-trade cost, τn, for all destinations n, keeping
the foreign demand, En, in the destinations unchanged (partial equilibrium).
6.1 Aggregate dynamics
Figure 9 shows the evolution from the old to the new steady state of average sales and
participation rates for MNEs and exporters. The average MNE sales increase by around
30 percent when trade costs decrease, while participation rates for MNEs decrease by
half. The transition is rather fast, with most of the adjustment taking place within three
periods. Given that sunk export costs are very low, most of the transition to the new
steady state for exporters occurs in one period: for the case of decreasing trade costs,
average export sales and participation rates are both about 30-percent higher than in
the initial steady state. Interestingly, the model without MNEs predicts smaller effects
for exporters: average sales increase by less than 25 percent and the participation rates
increase by only around 24-percent, when trade costs decrease by 20 percent. At the heart
of these differences is the self-selection of exporters into MNE activities when that option
is included in the model.
It is worth noting that increases and decreases in trade costs from the calibrated values
do not produce symmetric changes in the aggregate variables under consideration. For
instance, participation rates for exporters drop by 60 percent when trade costs increase,
but increase by 30 percent when trade costs decrease.
6.2 Life-cycle dynamics
In Figure 10 we show the steady-state exit rates and sales profiles, by age, for MNEs and
for exporters for the baseline economy, an economy with 20 percent higher trade costs,
and an economy with 20 percent lower trade costs.30
While life-cycle exit patterns of MNEs do not change much with trade-costs changes,
life-cycle growth becomes slower in an environment with lower trade costs: by age four,
new MNE sales (relative to entry) are five-percentage points lower than in our calibrated
baseline.
For exporters, including MNEs matters for the effects of moving from an environment
30 Because we only use data from the calibrated model, in Figure 10, we normalize sales relative to sales
at age 0 rather than age 1 as in Figures 3, 4 and 8.
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Figure 9: Aggregate effects of a 20-percent change in trade costs.
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Notes: Models calibrated to French data. The y-axis is log change with respect to the initial steady state.
Observations are at the firm-destination-year level. We show averages across destinations included in the
calibration, weighted by each destination’s share of export (MNE) firms.
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with high trade costs to one with low trade costs. The model with MNEs predicts that
new exporters decrease their life-cycle exit rates by seven percentage points by age nine
and experience higher sales growth (eight percentage points by age four). The model
without MNEs, however, predicts that new exporters have very similar exit and growth
patterns before and after the change. These differences between the two models translate
into differences in the dynamic behavior of aggregate exports after a shock shown in
Figure 9.
A lower τ decreases the likelihood of becoming an MNE, but increases the one of becoming
(or staying) an exporter; in the limit, for τ = 1, MNEs disappear and the model collapses
to one without MNEs. This implies that exporters’ life-cycle profiles are, on average, less
similar between the model with and without MNEs as τ increases. At the same time, a
change in trade costs produces a larger change in the life-cycle patterns of exit and growth
rates of the average exporter in the model with MNEs than in the model without MNEs.
This is because the model with MNEs has two (left and right) margins changing at the
same time, which results in a larger change in the number of fast-growing exporters.
Finally, Figure 10 naturally relates to the effects of liberalizing MNE activities on new
exporters’ dynamics. Since the differences in new exporters dynamics between the model
with and without MNEs is larger in an environment with high iceberg trade costs, moving
from a scenario without MNEs to one with MNEs leads to small changes in new exporters’
dynamics if trade costs are already low, but large changes if trade costs are high.
7 Conclusions
This paper studies the life-cycle dynamics of exporters and MNEs. We provide a comprehensive
set of facts on the life-cycle dynamics of new exporters and new MNEs that are informative
about the features to be included in dynamic models of exporters’ and MNEs’ behavior.
We show that a dynamic model of the proximity-concentration trade-off in Helpman et al.
(2004) is qualitatively consistent with the documented facts. Our calibrated version of
the model also includes heterogenous sunk and fixed costs at the firm-destination level,
similar to Roberts and Tybout (1997). We show that, quantitatively, the standard model of
exports dynamics augmented to include MNEs goes far in matching cross-sectional and
dynamic moments of the data on both exporters and MNEs.
Comparing the predictions of our calibrated model with both exporters and MNEs and
a dynamic model with only exporters, we find that enriching the canonical dynamic
model of trade to include MNEs—a first-order feature of the data—has consequences
30
Figure 10: Life-cycle effects of a 20-percent change in trade costs.
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(e) Exit rates
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
M
od
e-
m
ar
ke
t-s
pe
ci
fic
 e
xi
t r
at
es
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Mode-market-specific age
baseline trade costs
high trade costs
low trade costs
(f) Sales growth
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Notes: Models calibrated to French data. High, low, and baseline trade costs refer, respectively, to iceberg trade
costs, τn, which are 20 percent higher, lower, and equal to the baseline values, for each destination n. Number
of exits from a mode-market relative to the number of firms active in a mode-market, by mode-market-specific
age. Log of firm-destination export (affiliate) sales with respect to firm-destination export (affiliate) sales in the
year after entry, for firms with five or more years in the market. Observations are at the firm-destination-year
level. We show averages across destinations included in the calibration, weighted by each destination’s share of
export (MNE) firms. 31
for the life-cycle and aggregate dynamic behavior of exporters after a trade-liberalization
episode. The different response of the exporters between the two models hinge on the
right truncation of fast-growing exporters induced by the inclusion of the MNE choice.
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A Computations
A.1 Expected productivity growth for the average exporter
Assume that firm productivity follows a first-order autoregressive process, zt = ρzt−1 +
σεεt, with εt ∼ N(0, 1), and 0 ≤ ρ < 1. The expected value of zt is zero with variance given
by σ2z ≡ σ2ε/(1− ρ2).
Conditional on a starting productivity value of k, the expected growth for an exporter in
t in the model with only left truncation is given by
GL(k) ≡ E (zt − zt−1 | zt > z, zt−1 = k) ,
while in a model with left and right truncation, we have that
GLR(k) ≡ E (zt − zt−1 | z < zt < z̄, z = k) ,
with z and z̄ denoting the left and right truncation points, respectively.
After some algebra, we get that
GL(k) = σε
φ(c(k))
1− Φ(c(k))
− k(1− ρ)
and
GLR(k) = σε
φ(c(k))− φ(c̄(k))
Φ(c̄(k))− Φ(c(k))
− k(1− ρ),
with c̄(k) ≡ (z̄−ρk)/σε, c(k) ≡ (z−ρk)/σε, and φ(·) and Φ(·) denoting the p.d.f. and c.d.f.,
respectively, of a standard normal distribution.
Taking expectations over all exporters yields
GL =
1
1− F (z)
∫ ∞
z
(
σε
φ(c(k))
1− Φ(c(k))
− k(1− ρ)
)
dF (k)
and
GLR =
1
F (z̄)− F (z)
∫ z̄
z
(
σε
φ(c(k))− φ(c̄(k))
Φ(c̄(k))− Φ(c(k))
− k(1− ρ)
)
dF (k).
The average exporter grows faster in the model with only left truncation if and only if
GL > GLR, which is equivalent to
σε
(∫ ∞
z
φ(c(k))
1− Φ(c(k))
dF (k)
1− F (z)
−
∫ z̄
z
φ(c(k))− φ(c̄(k))
Φ(c̄(k))− Φ(c(k))
dF (k)
F (z̄)− F (z)
)
>
(1− ρ)
(∫ ∞
z
k
dF (k)
1− F (z)
−
∫ z̄
z
k
dF (k)
F (z̄)− F (z)
)
.
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The r.h.s is simply
(1− ρ)σz
(
φ(z/σz)
1− Φ(z/σz)
− φ(z/σz)− φ(z̄/σz)
Φ(z̄/σz)− Φ(z/σz)
)
.
Hence, ∫ ∞
z
φ(c(k))
1− Φ(c(k))
dF (k)
1− F (z)
−
∫ z̄
z
φ(c(k))− φ(c̄(k))
Φ(c̄(k))− Φ(c(k))
dF (k)
F (z̄)− F (z)
>√
1− ρ
1 + ρ
(
φ(z/σz)
1− Φ(z/σz)
− φ(z/σz)− φ(z̄/σz)
Φ(z̄/σz)− Φ(z/σz)
)
.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Firm-productivity z follows a first-order autoregressive process, z′ = ρz + σεε′ with ε′ ∼
N(0, 1) and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Let log φ̄me ≡ z̄me , log φ̄m ≡ z̄m, and log φ̄x ≡ z̄x, with z̄me > z̄m > z̄x.
Let fm(a) denote the probability of exit from MNE status in t + 1 for a firm that was not
an MNE in t− 1 and had productivity a in t− 1,
fm(a) =
∞∫̄
zme
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄m | x)g(x− ρa)dx
1−G(z̄me − ρa)
, (B.1)
where g(·) andG(·) denote, respectively, the probability and cumulative density functions
of a normal distribution with mean zero and dispersion parameter σε. Let fx(a) denote
the probability of exit from export status in t+ 1 for a firm that was only domestic in t− 1
and had a in t− 1,
fx(a) =
z̄me∫̄
zx
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄x | x)g(x− ρa)dx
G(z̄me − ρa)−G(z̄x − ρa)
. (B.2)
Under which conditions fm(a) < fx(a)? First, notice that if z̄x = z̄m = z̄, then
∞∫
z̄me
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄ | x)g(x− ρa)dx ≤
z̄me∫
z̄
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄ | x)g(x− ρa)dx. (B.3)
Let z̄m = z̄x + ξ, with ξ > 0. Then,
lim
ξ→0
∞∫
z̄me
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄x + ξ | x)g(x− ρa)dx =
∞∫
z̄me
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄x | x)g(x− ρa)dx,
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which implies the inequality in (B.3). This means that the numerator in (B.1) is lower than
in (B.2). If
1−G(z̄me − ρa) > G(z̄me − ρa)−G(z̄x − ρa), (B.4)
then fm(a) < fx(a). Clearly, the inequality is true if z̄me = z̄x. Let z̄me = z̄x + ϕ, with ϕ > 0.
When ϕ → 0, then 1 − 2G(z̄x + ϕ − ρa) > −G(z̄x − ρa). More generally, there exists ϕ∗
such that for 0 ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗, the inequality in (B.4) holds and fm(a) < fx(a).
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Firm productivity z follows a first-order autoregressive process, z′ = ρz + σεε′ with ε′ ∼
N(0, 1) and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Let z̄me and z̄m be the productivity entry and exit thresholds,
respectively. Let f(a) denote the probability of exit from multinational status in t + 1 for
a firm that was not a multinational in t− 1, and with productivity a in t-1, defined by
f(a) =
∞∫̄
zme
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄m | x)g(x− ρa)dx
1−G(z̄me − ρa)
,
where g(·) andG(·) denote, respectively, the probability and cumulative density functions
of a normal distribution with mean zero and dispersion parameter σε.
Let ξ → 0, with ξ > 0. We will show that f(.) is a decreasing function—i.e., f(a) − f(a −
ξ) < 0. Replacing, we get that
f(a)− f(a− ξ) =
∞∫̄
zme
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄m | x)g(x− ρa)dx
1−G(z̄me − ρa)
−
∞∫̄
zme
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄m | x)g(x− ρa+ ρξ)dx
1−G(z̄me − ρa+ ρξ)
,
which, after some algebra, becomes
f(a)−f(a−ξ) =
∞∫̄
zme
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄m | x) [g(x− ρa)(1−G(z̄me − ρa+ ρξ)− g(x− ρa+ ρξ)(1−G(z̄me − ρa))] dx
[1−G(z̄me − ρa)] [1−G(z̄me − ρa+ ρξ)]
.
Since the denominator is always positive, we need to show that the numerator is negative.
Note that Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄m | x) is decreasing in x and that
∞∫̄
zme
g(x− ρa)dx
1−G(z̄me − ρa)
−
∞∫̄
zme
g(x− ρa+ ρξ)dx
1−G(z̄me − ρa+ ρξ)
= 0.
We then need to show that there exists only one point m ∈ [c,∞] such that for x < m,
g(x− ρa) [1−G(z̄me − ρa+ ρξ)]− g(x− ρa+ ρξ) [1−G(z̄me − ρa)] < 0,
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and for x > m,
g(x− ρa) [1−G(z̄me − ρa+ ρξ)]− g(x− ρa+ ρξ) [1−G(z̄me − ρa)] > 0.
Since for ξ > 0 and ξ → 0, G(x− ξ) = G(x)− ξg(x) and g(x− ξ) = g(x)− ξg′(x), replacing,
we get that
g(x− ρa) [1−G(z̄me − ρa+ ρξ)]− g(x− ρa+ ρξ) [1−G(z̄me − ρa)]
= g(x− ρa) [1−G(z̄me − ρa)− ρξg(z̄me − ρa)]− [g(x− ρa) + ρξg′(x− ρa)] [1−G(z̄me − ρa)]
= −ρξg(x− ρa)g(z̄me − ρa)− ρξg′(x− ρa) [1−G(z̄me − ρa)]
= ρξg(x− ρa)
{
−g(z̄me − ρa) +
x− ρa
σ2ε
[1−G(z̄me − ρa)]
}
, (B.5)
where, in the last equality, we use that g′(x− ρa) = −g(x− ρa)(x− ρa)/σ2ε .
Denote the function inside the curly brackets in (B.5) as
k(x) ≡ −g(z̄me − ρa) +
x− ρa
σ2ε
[1−G(z̄me − ρa)] .
For x = m, k(m) = 0, with m = cσ2ε +ρa where c ≡ g(z̄me −ρa)/ [1−G(z̄me − ρa)] > 0 (since
[1−G(z̄me − ρa)] and g(z̄me −ρa) are positive constants). It remains to show that for x < m,
k(x) is negative, and for x > m, k(x) is positive. Taking the derivative of k(·) with respect
to x yields
k′(x) =
1−G(z̄me − ρa)
σ2ε
,
which is positive for all x. Thus, k(x) < k(m), for x < m, and k(x) > k(m), for x > m,
which implies that the expression in (B.5) is decreasing, proving that f(a) is a decreasing
function.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Firm-productivity z follows a first-order autoregressive process, z′ = ρz + σεε′ with ε′ ∼
N(0, 1) and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Let z̄ denote the exit cutoff and z̄e the entry cutoff into an
international activity. Let c be a constant in the interval [z̄e,∞). Let
f(a) =
c∫̄
ze
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄ | x)g(x− ρa)dx
G(c)−G(z̄e − ρa)
denote the probability of exit from status i in t+1 for a firm that is not yet in status i
in t-1 and that has a productivity level of a in t-1. The functions g(·) and G(·) denote,
respectively, the probability and cumulative density functions of a normal distribution
with mean zero and dispersion parameter σε.
Let ξ and ϕ be two positive constants, with ξ ≤ ϕ. Without loss of generality, the entry
cutoff is z̄e = z̄+ϕ. We want to show that when we increase the exit cutoff from z̄ to z̄+ ξ,
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the exit probability increases more when sunk costs are zero—i.e., ϕ = 0,
f(a; ξ > 0;ϕ = 0)− f(a; ξ = 0;ϕ = 0) > f(a; ξ > 0;ϕ > 0)− f(a; ξ = 0;ϕ > 0).
The first term is given by
f(a; ξ > 0;ϕ = 0)− f(a; ξ = 0;ϕ = 0) =
c∫̄
z
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄ + ξ | x)g(x− ρa)dx
G(c)−G(z̄ − ρa)
−
c∫̄
z
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄ | x)g(x− ρa)dx
G(c)−G(z̄ − ρa)
, (B.6)
while the second one is
f(a; ξ > 0;ϕ > 0)− f(a; ξ = 0;ϕ > 0) =
c∫
z̄+ϕ
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄ + ξ | x)g(x− ρa)dx
G(c)−G(z̄ + ϕ− ρa)
−
c∫
z̄+ϕ
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄ | x)g(x− ρa)dx
G(c)−G(z̄ + ϕ− ρa)
. (B.7)
Rearranging, we get that
f(a; ξ > 0;ϕ = 0)− f(a; ξ > 0;ϕ > 0) > f(a; ξ = 0;ϕ = 0)− f(a; ξ = 0;ϕ > 0),
which, after some algebra, yields
c∫̄
z
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄ + ξ | x)g(x− ρa)dx−
c∫
z̄+ϕ
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄ + ξ | x)g(x− ρa)dx
(G(c)−G(z̄ − ρa))(G(c)−G(z̄ + ϕ− ρa))
>
c∫̄
z
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄ | x)g(x− ρa)dx−
c∫
z̄+ϕ
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄ | x)g(x− ρa)dx
(G(c)−G(z̄ − ρa))(G(c)−G(z̄ + ϕ− ρa))
.
Denominators are always positive and simplify. The numerators can be written as
z̄+ϕ∫
z̄
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄ + ξ | x)g(x− ρa)dx+
c∫
z̄+ϕ
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄ + ξ | x)g(x− ρa)dx
−
c∫
z̄+ϕ
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄ + ξ | x)g(x− ρa)dx =
z̄+ϕ∫
z̄
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄ + ξ | x)g(x− ρa)dx,
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and analogously for the numerator in the right-hand side of the inequality. Hence,
z̄+ϕ∫
z̄
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄ + ξ | x)g(x− ρa)dx >
z̄+ϕ∫
z̄
Pr(ρx+ σεε ≤ z̄ | x)g(x− ρa)dx.
Because Pr(ρx+σεε ≤ z̄+ξ | x) > Pr(ρx+σεε ≤ z̄ | x), we show that when we increase the
exit cutoff, the probability of exit upon entry increases by less with the presence of sunk
costs. 
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Let φ(·) and Φ(·) denote the p.d.f. and c.d.f., respectively, of a standard normal distribution.
Then,
GL ≡ E (zt − zt−1 | zt > z, zt−1 = z) = E (zt | zt > z, zt−1 = z)− z
= E (ρzt−1 + σεεt | zt > z, zt−1 = z)− z = ρz + E (σεεt | zt > z, zt−1 = z)− z
= ρz + σεE (εt | εt > z(1− ρ)/σε)− z = σεE (εt | εt > c)− σεc
= σε
(
φ(c)
1− Φ(c)
− c
)
,
where c ≡ (1− ρ)z/σε. Similar calculations yield
GLR ≡ E (zt − zt−1 | z < zt < z̄, zt−1 = z) = σε
(
φ(c)− φ(c̄)
Φ(c̄)− Φ(c)
− c
)
,
where c̄ ≡ (1− ρ)z̄/σε.
Growth is higher with left (L) than with left and right (LR) truncation when
φ(c)
1− Φ(c)
>
φ(c)− φ(c̄)
Φ(c̄)− Φ(c)
,
or equivalently,
Φ(c̄)− Φ(c)
1− Φ(c)
>
φ(c)− φ(c̄)
φ(c)
.
The expression on the left-hand side (l.h.s.) of the inequality has the following properties:
lim
c̄→c
Φ(c̄)− Φ(c)
1− Φ(c)
= 0; lim
c̄→∞
Φ(c̄)− Φ(c)
1− Φ(c)
= 1;
dl.h.s.
dc̄
=
φ(c̄)
1− Φ(c)
· > 0.
With z̄ > z, and c̄ > 0, the expression on the right-hand side (r.h.s.) of the inequality has
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the following properties:
lim
c̄→c
φ(c)− φ(c̄)
φ(c)
= 0; lim
c̄→∞
φ(c)− φ(c̄)
φ(c)
= 1;
dr.h.s.
dc̄
= c̄
φ(c̄)
φ(c)
> 0.
Both functions have the same limits and both are increasing with c̄. The left-hand side,
however, grows faster than the right-hand side when
c̄ <
φ(c)
1− Φ(c)
.
Therefore, there exits c̄∗—and consequently, z̄∗—such that for all c < c̄ < c̄∗, GL > GLR,
with GL = GLR for c̄ = c̄∗.
C Quantitative model
We extend the model in Section 4 to include sunk export costs, F x > 0, paid in units of
labor andFm > F x. Additionally, we assume that all fixed and sunk costs are heterogeneous
across firms, but fixed over time for each firm. Fixed and sunk costs distributions are
independent of the firm productivity distribution, and follow a log-normal distribution,
log(F se ) ∼ N(µse, (σse)2) and log(f s) ∼ N(µs, (σs)2),
where s = m,x.
Firms have three possible states: producing in the domestic market for home consumers
only(D); producing in the domestic market for home and foreign consumers (X); or
producing in the domestic market for home consumers and in the foreign market for
foreign consumers (M ).
The value of being an MNE with productivity φ is given by
V (φ, Fme , F
x
e , f
m, fx,M) =
Xd(φ)
σ
+ max
{
Xm(φ)
σ
− fm + βEφ′V (φ′, Fme , F xe , fm, fx,M | φ),
βEφ′V (φ
′, Fme , F
x
e , f
m, fx, D | φ), X
x(φ)
σ
− fx − F xe +βEφ′V (φ′, Fme , F xe , fm, fx, X | φ)} .
An MNE chooses among continuing its operations abroad and incurring the per-period
fixed cost fm; shutting down the affiliate and becoming an exporter into the foreign
market, incurring a per-period fixed cost fx and sunk cost F x; or abandoning the foreign
market altogether.
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The value of being an exporter with productivity φ is given by
V (φ, Fme , F
x
e , f
m, fx, X) =
Xd(φ)
σ
+ max
{
Xx(φ)
σ
− fx + βEφ′V (φ′, Fme , F xe , fm, fx, X | φ),
βEφ′V (φ
′, Fme , F
x
e , f
m, fx, D | φ), X
m(φ)
σ
− fm − Fme +βEφ′V (φ′, Fme , F xe , fm, fx,M | φ)} .
An exporter can choose to become an MNE in the foreign market and pay the per-period
fixed cost fm and the entry sunk cost Fm; continue exporting to the foreign market, and
pay the per-period fixed cost fx; or operate in and serve only its home market.
The value of being a domestic firm with productivity φ is given by
V (φ, Fme , F
x
e , f
m, fx, D) =
Xd(φ)
σ
+ max
{
Xm(φ)
σ
− fm − Fme + βEφ′V (φ′, Fme , F xe , fm, fx,M | φ),
βEφ′V (φ
′, Fme , F
x
e , f
m, fx, D | φ), X
x(φ)
σ
− fx − F xe +βEφ′V (φ′, Fme , F xe , fm, fx, X | φ)} .
A domestic firm can choose to become an MNE in the foreign market and pay the per-
period fixed cost fm and the entry sunk cost Fm; export to the foreign market, and pay the
per-period fixed cost fx and sunk cost F x; or operate in and serve only its home market.
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D Additional figures
Figure D.1: Life-cycle dynamics of exports for new MNEs.
(a) Export-to-foreign sales ratio
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(b) Share of exporters, MNEs with export experience
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Notes: Data on MNE sales are available only for Norway. (D.1a): ratio of exports-to-foreign sales, by years
from MNE entry, at the firm-destination-year level, average over MNE-destination pairs with at least four
years in the market and with positive exports before MNE entry. (D.1b): share of exporters among MNEs
that export (to the market of the affiliate) in the year before MNE entry, by years from MNE entry, for
firm-destination pairs that survive at least four years as MNEs in a market.
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Figure D.2: Exit rates by age: MNEs versus exporters, OLS.
(a) France
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(b) Norway
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Notes: Difference in coefficients and 95%-confidence bands from estimating, by OLS,
D(Exitinmta) = β0MNEinta +
∑
a
βa1D(ageinmt = a) +
∑
a
βa2MNEinta ×D(ageinmt = a) + εinmta,
whereD(Exitinmta) is a dummy equal to one in the year t in which firm i of age a exits modem in market n, and
zero otherwise; MNEinta is one if firm i at age a is active in market n and year t as an MNE, and zero otherwise;
and D(ageinmt = a) equals one if firm i in market n and mode m at time t is of age a, and zero otherwise. We
include year, industry, country fixed effects, and the log of home sales as a control. Standard errors are clustered
by industry. Exporters are the base group. Observations are at the firm-destination-year level. Exporters refers
to non-MNE exporters.
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Figure D.3: Exit rates by age: experienced versus non-experienced MNEs, OLS.
(a) France
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(b) Norway
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Notes: Number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number of firms active in a mode-market, by mode-
market-specific age. Experienced MNEs are new affiliates of MNEs that exported to a foreign market for one or more
years before opening an affiliate there.Difference in coefficients and 95%-confidence bands from estimating, by OLS,
D(Exitinmta) = β0MNEinta +
∑
a
βa1D(ageinmt = a) +
∑
a
βa2MNEinta ×D(ageinmt = a)
+β3exp.mneinmta +
∑
a
βa4exp.mneinmta ×D(ageinmt = a) + β5exp.mneinmta ×MNEinta
+
∑
a
βa6D(ageinmt = a)×MNEinta × exp.mneinmta + εinmta,
where D(Exitinmta) is a dummy equal to one in the year t in which firm i of age a exits mode m in market n, and
zero otherwise; MNEinta is one if firm i at age a is active in market n and year t as an MNE, and zero otherwise; and
D(ageinmt = a) equals one if firm i in market n and mode m at time t is of age a, and zero otherwise. exp.mneinmta
indicates the years of export experience before MNE entry in market n, for firm i at age a and year t. We include
year, industry, country fixed effects, and the log of home sales as a control. Standard errors are clustered by industry.
Non-experienced MNEs are the base group. Observations at the firm-destination-year level.
Figure D.4: Sales growth by age and cohort.
(a) Exporters, France
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(b) Exporters, Norway
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(c) MNEs, Norway
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Notes: Log of firm-destination export (affiliate) sales with respect to firm-destination export (MNE) sales in the year
after entry, firms with at least t years in the market, selected cohorts in each mode. Observations are at the firm-
destination-year level. We show averages across destinations weighted by each destination’s share of export (MNE)
firms. Log of sales first demeaned by industry, year, and destination fixed effects. Exporters refers to non-MNE
exporters.
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Figure D.5: Greenfield versus M&A FDI, Germany.
(a) Exit rates by age
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(b) Sales growth by age
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Notes: (D.5a): number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number of firms active in a mode-market, by
mode-market-specific age. (D.5b): log of firm-destination MNE sales with respect to firm-destination MNE sales
in the year after entry, firms with five or more years in the market. Observations are at the firm-destination-year
level. We show averages across destinations weighted by each destination’s share of MNE firms. Log of sales
first demeaned by industry, year, and destination fixed effects. The sample period is 2005-2011 (no information
on FDI entry mode available before 2005). Source: Deutsche Bundesbank Research Data and Service Centre,
Microdatabase Direct investment, own calculations.
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Figure D.6: First-year exit rates and market characteristics, Norway.
(a) Exporters – market size
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(b) MNEs – market size
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(c) Exporters – distance
AE
AF
AG
AL
AM
AN
AO
AR
AT AU
AZ
BA
BB
BD
BE BG
BH
BJBM
BN
BO
BR
BS
BW
BY
BZ
CA CD
CG
CH
CI
CLCM
CN
CO
CR
CS
CU
CV
CY
CZDE
DJ
DK
DODZ ECEE EG
ER
ES
ET
FI
FJ
FR
GA
GB
GD
GE
GH
GMGN
GQ
GR
GT
HK
HN
HR
HT
HU
IDIE
IL IN
IQ
IR
IS IT
JMJO
JP
KE
KR
KW
KZ
LA
LB
LC
LK
LR
LT
LU
LV
LY
MA
MD
MG
MK ML
MN
MO
MR
MT
MU
MV
MW
MXMY
MZ
NE
NG
NI
NL
NP
NZ
O
PA PE
PG
PH
PK
PL
PR
PT
PY
QA
RORU
RW
SA
SC
SD
SE SG
SISK
SL
SN
SR
SV
SY
TD
TG
TH
TMTN
TR
T
TW
TZ
UA
UG
US
UY
UZ
VC
VE
VNYE
ZA
ZM
ZW
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Fi
rs
t-y
ea
r e
xi
t r
at
es
5 6 7 8 9 10
Distance, km (logs)
(d) MNEs – distance
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Notes: Number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number of firms active in a mode-market,
for exporters and MNEs, in the first year upon market-mode entry. Destinations with ten or more firm-
year observations and with available GDP data. Exporters refers to non-MNE exporters. GDP data from
International Financial Statistics (IMF). Distance data from CEPII (Mayer and Zignago, 2011).
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Figure D.7: Entry rates and market characteristics, Norway.
(a) Exporters – market size
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(b) MNEs – market size
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(c) Exporters – distance
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(d) MNEs – distance
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Notes: Number of entries to a mode-market relative to the number of domestic firms (MNEs) active in the
home market. Destinations with ten or more firm-year observations and with available GDP data. Exporters
refers to non-MNE exporters. GDP data from International Financial Statistics (IMF). Distance data from CEPII
(Mayer and Zignago, 2011).
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Figure D.8: Exporters’ exit rates by age: calibrated models and data, by country.
(a) Austria
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(b) Benelux
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(k) Portugal
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(l) Sweden
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(m) Tunisia
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(n) United States
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(o) China
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(p) Rest of the World
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Notes: Models calibrated to French data. Number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number of firms
active in a mode-market, for each destination. Rest of the World is a weighted average among the remaining
countries in the sample. Exporters in the data refers to non-MNE exporters. Observations are at the firm-
destination-year level.
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Figure D.9: Exporters’ sales growth by age: calibrated models and data, by country.
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(b) Benelux
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(c) Switzerland
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(d) Germany
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(f) Spain
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(g) Great Britain
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(h) Italy
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(i) Morocco
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(j) Poland
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(k) Portugal
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(l) Sweden
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(m) Tunisia
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(n) United States
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(o) China
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(p) Rest of the World
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Notes: Models calibrated to French data. Log of firm-destination export sales with respect to firm-destination
export sales in the year after entry, average over firms with five or more years in the market, by destination. Rest
of the World is a weighted average among the remaining countries in the sample. Exporters in the data refers to
non-MNE exporters. Observations are at the firm-destination-year level.
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Figure D.10: Exporters exit rates and sales growth, by age.
(a) New exporters’ exit rates
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(b) New exporters’ sales growth
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Notes: Models calibrated to French data. (D.10a): number of exits from a mode-market relative to the
number of firms active in a mode-market, by mode-market-specific age. (D.10b): log of firm-destination
export sales with respect to firm-destination export sales in the year after entry, an average over firms
with five or more years in the market. In the data, log of sales are first demeaned by industry, year, and
destination fixed effects. Observations are at the firm-destination-year level. We show averages across
destinations included in the calibration, weighted by each destination’s share of export firms. Weights are
data-based (model-based) for data (model) variables. Exporters in the data refers to non-MNE exporters.
Figure D.11: Sales growth, by age and exporter type.
(a) Never-MNE exporters
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(b) Ever-MNE exporters
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Notes: Models calibrated to French data. Log of firm-destination export sales with respect to firm-destination
export sales in the year after export entry, an average over firms with five or more years in the market as
exporters. Observations are at the firm-destination-year level. We show averages across destinations included in
the calibration, weighted by each destination’s share of export firms. Never-MNE exporters are exporters that,
in our sample period, do not change to MNE status. Ever-MNE exporters are exporters that become MNEs after
export entry. Exports for ever-MNE exporters are computed for the years before MNE entry. Exporters in the
data refers to non-MNE exporters.
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E Additional tables
Table E.1: Summary statistics.
France
share of revenues share of employment share of firm-year obs firm-year obs
Domestic firms 0.076 0.116 0.697 671,283
Non-MNE exporters 0.289 0.317 0.287 276,499
Non-exporter MNEs 0.005 0.010 0.001 1,007
Exporter MNEs 0.630 0.557 0.015 14,589
Norway
share of revenues share of employment share of firm-year obs firm-year obs
Domestic firms 0.153 0.235 0.622 55,359
Non-MNE exporters 0.625 0.630 0.364 32,376
Non-exporter MNEs 0.002 0.002 0.002 136
Exporter MNEs 0.220 0.133 0.013 1,147
Notes: Non-MNE exporters are exporters that do not have MNE activities. Non-exporter MNEs are MNEs that are
not exporters. Exporter MNEs are MNEs that also export.
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Table E.2: Exit rates and growth rates, OLS.
Dep variable D(exit) Sales, relative to age one
market-mode market market age calendar yr 12-mo yr "never MNEs" "ever MNEs"
FRA NOR FRA FRA FRA (exp) NOR FRA (exp) FRA NOR FRA NOR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
MNE -0.181*** -0.211*** -0.273*** -0.177*** -0.079**
(0.015) (0.038) (0.014) (0.016) (0.045)
D(age = 0) -0.172*** -0.218*** -0.171*** -0.172*** -0.436*** -0.686*** -0.109*** -0.436*** -0.683*** -0.448*** -2.540**
(0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.045) (0.010) (0.011) (0.045) (0.089) (1.059)
×MNE 0.106*** 0.116*** 0.126*** 0.106*** 0.469***
(0.015) (0.039) (0.015) (0.017) (0.109)
D(age = 1) -0.246*** -0.270 -0.246*** -0.246***
(0.004) (0.011)) (0.004) (0.004)
×MNE 0.197*** 0.257*** 0.229*** 0.198***
(0.029) (0.045) (0.029) (0.025)
D(age = 2) -0.283*** -0.316*** -0.283*** -0.283*** 0.154*** 0.178*** 0.126*** 0.154*** 0.179*** 0.204** 0.929
(0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.024) (0.009) (0.008) (0.0249) (0.080) (0.972)
×MNE 0.171*** 0.236*** 0.207*** 0.179*** 0.021
(0.019) (0.044) (0.018) (0.020) (0.102)
D(age = 3) -0.308*** -0.334*** -0.308*** -0.308*** 0.209*** 0.277*** 0.164*** 0.209*** 0.280*** 0.361*** 1.376
(0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.042) (0.014) (0.012) (0.043) (0.086) (1.509)
×MNE 0.207*** 0.250*** 0.246*** 0.214*** 0.071
(0.021) (0.044) (0.020) (0.026) (0.140)
D(age = 4) -0.316*** -0.343*** -0.316*** -0.317*** 0.157*** 0.241*** 0.088*** 0.157*** 0.245*** 0.460*** 2.671
(0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.020) (0.054) (0.020) (0.020) (0.055) (0.125) (2.166)
×MNE 0.214*** 0.283*** 0.248*** 0.216*** 0.132
(0.025) (0.050) (0.024) (0.026) (0.143)
(0.008) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008)
(0.018) (0.056) (0.017) (0.019)
(0.007) (0.019) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 1,044,855 74,119 1,044,855 1,044,855 405,009 25,887 297,896 405,009 24,902 2,632 104
Notes: Dummy equals one if firm i exits: cols 1-2: mode-market by mode-market age; col 3: market by mode-market
age; col 4: mode-market by market age. Cols 5-11: Log of firm-destination export sales with respect to firm-destination
export sales in the year after export entry, firms with five or more years in the market-mode. Col 7: adjusted by partial-
year effects. Cols 8-9: Never-MNE are exporters that, in our sample period, do not change to MNE status. Cols 10-11:
Ever-MNE are exporters that become MNEs after export entry. Exports for ever-MNE exporters computed for the years
before MNE entry. All regressions with year, industry, and country fixed effects. Regressions for exit rates include log
of Home sales and age dummies (and interactions) till age 6. Standard errors, clustered by industry, are in parentheses.
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Observations are at the firm-destination-year level. Exporters refers to non-MNE
exporters.
54
Table E.3: Foreign-to-domestic sales ratio, by country.
France Norway
rxn r
m
n r
x
n r
m
n
Austria 0.003 0.024* Austria 0.009 0.432
Benelux 0.068 0.135* Belgium 0.029 0.086
Switzerland 0.011 0.064 Canada 0.010 0.130
China 0.014 0.213* Germany 0.087 0.456
Germany 0.123 0.181 Denmark 0.030 0.501
Denmark 0.003 0.017* Spain 0.031 0.051
Spain 0.044 0.119 Finland 0.025 0.546
Great Britain 0.040 0.181 France 0.045 0.231
Italy 0.054 0.100 Great Britain 0.069 0.193
Morocco 0.004 0.037 Italy 0.034 0.094
Portugal 0.006 0.019* Netherlands 0.031 0.178
Poland 0.013 0.038 Poland 0.016 0.088
Sweden 0.012 0.037* Sweden 0.065 0.918
Tunisia 0.004 0.008* Singapore 0.018 0.382
United States 0.038 0.427* United States 0.056 0.749
RoW 0.067 0.074 RoW 0.009 0.110
Notes: rxn refers to the export-to-domestic sales ratio, while rmn refers to the MNE affiliate-to-
domestic sales ratio, for market n. (*) imputed values. RoW refers to the rest of the world, a
weighted average among the remaining countries in the sample. Observations are at the firm-
destination-year level.
Table E.4: Targeted moments, model and data, summary statistics.
Data, avg Model, avg
France Norway France Norway
Share of MNEs 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Share of exporters 0.090 0.087 0.085 0.085
First-year exit rate, MNEs 0.248 0.181 0.232 0.149
First-year exit rate, exporters 0.462 0.528 0.410 0.417
Average exit rate, MNEs 0.182 0.149 0.194 0.169
Average exit rate, exporters 0.316 0.313 0.254 0.252
Notes: Observations are at the firm-destination-year level. For each variable, we show an
unweighted averages across destinations included in the calibration. Share of exporters (MNEs)
to market n calculated relative to firms that do not export to (do not have affiliates in) destination
n. Exporter (MNE) exit rates are calculated relative to exporters (MNEs) that stay in the market.
Exporters in the data refers to non-MNE exporters.
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Table E.5: Targeted moments, model and data, by country.
Data Model
shares 1st-yr exit rates avg exit rates shares 1st-yr exit rates avg exit rates
exp MNEs exp MNEs exp MNEs exp MNEs exp MNEs exp MNEs
France
Benelux 0.155 0.004 0.339 0.299 0.269 0.209 0.150 0.005 0.339 0.273 0.203 0.196
Switzerland 0.133 0.003 0.501 0.223 0.354 0.166 0.141 0.003 0.501 0.214 0.291 0.185
Germany 0.128 0.005 0.418 0.250 0.284 0.174 0.118 0.005 0.418 0.245 0.218 0.188
Spain 0.118 0.005 0.416 0.249 0.285 0.187 0.114 0.005 0.416 0.250 0.231 0.188
Italy 0.111 0.004 0.438 0.295 0.297 0.192 0.104 0.004 0.438 0.285 0.240 0.207
G. Britain 0.105 0.004 0.429 0.297 0.291 0.194 0.105 0.004 0.429 0.276 0.263 0.212
U. States 0.078 0.006 0.511 0.238 0.362 0.175 0.077 0.006 0.511 0.222 0.261 0.189
Portugal 0.070 0.002 0.455 0.235 0.316 0.157 0.068 0.002 0.455 0.203 0.259 0.196
Morocco 0.057 0.002 0.543 0.218 0.391 0.162 0.053 0.002 0.543 0.200 0.286 0.190
Tunisia 0.052 0.001 0.529 0.298 0.379 0.213 0.049 0.001 0.529 0.273 0.274 0.246
Austria 0.054 0.001 0.462 0.258 0.318 0.182 0.053 0.001 0.462 0.232 0.300 0.215
Poland 0.051 0.003 0.455 0.223 0.307 0.185 0.048 0.003 0.455 0.221 0.265 0.192
Sweden 0.049 0.001 0.445 0.235 0.307 0.154 0.048 0.001 0.445 0.193 0.273 0.200
Denmark 0.050 0.001 0.452 0.195 0.311 0.137 0.047 0.001 0.452 0.154 0.277 0.186
China 0.036 0.003 0.521 0.188 0.353 0.146 0.035 0.003 0.521 0.165 0.306 0.176
RoW 0.194 0.008 0.488 0.273 0.327 0.188 0.181 0.008 0.488 0.253 0.220 0.201
Norway
Austria 0.031 0.001 0.527 0.263 0.282 0.180 0.031 0.001 0.527 0.201 0.298 0.229
Belgium 0.055 0.001 0.552 0.214 0.313 0.129 0.060 0.001 0.552 0.186 0.240 0.169
Canada 0.039 0.001 0.549 0.222 0.318 0.117 0.040 0.001 0.549 0.090 0.328 0.154
Germany 0.135 0.004 0.541 0.182 0.285 0.166 0.121 0.005 0.541 0.090 0.258 0.137
Denmark 0.193 0.004 0.511 0.163 0.270 0.139 0.175 0.004 0.511 0.150 0.232 0.166
Spain 0.060 0.001 0.533 0.059 0.299 0.131 0.070 0.001 0.533 0.066 0.232 0.128
Finland 0.099 0.002 0.544 0.192 0.273 0.141 0.095 0.002 0.544 0.151 0.264 0.187
France 0.073 0.003 0.524 0.310 0.276 0.168 0.071 0.003 0.524 0.258 0.278 0.209
G. Britain 0.123 0.006 0.506 0.179 0.268 0.131 0.114 0.006 0.506 0.158 0.251 0.165
Italy 0.062 0.002 0.553 0.154 0.297 0.119 0.078 0.001 0.553 0.150 0.229 0.153
Netherlands 0.100 0.002 0.528 0.238 0.274 0.136 0.100 0.002 0.528 0.180 0.280 0.188
Poland 0.055 0.002 0.504 0.071 0.303 0.086 0.053 0.002 0.504 0.052 0.280 0.137
RoW 0.005 0.000 0.572 0.204 0.364 0.168 0.005 0.000 0.572 0.171 0.372 0.240
Sweden 0.249 0.007 0.484 0.158 0.239 0.151 0.226 0.007 0.484 0.154 0.199 0.160
Singapore 0.035 0.002 0.505 0.150 0.280 0.120 0.035 0.002 0.505 0.118 0.298 0.167
U. States 0.077 0.004 0.519 0.130 0.262 0.128 0.077 0.004 0.519 0.116 0.270 0.157
Notes: Share of exporters (MNEs) to market n calculated relative to firms that do not export to (do not have affiliates in)
destination n. Exporter (MNE) exit rates are calculated relative to exporters (MNEs) that stay in the market. First-year
exit rate refers to exit at age zero. RoW refers to the rest of the world, a weighted average among the remaining countries
in the sample. Exporters in the data refers to non-MNE exporters. Observations are at the firm-destination-year level.
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Table E.6: Calibrated parameters, by country.
Model with MNEs Model without MNEs
log(fxn ) log(f
m
n ) log(F
x
n ) log(F
m
n ) log(f
x
n ) log(F
x
n )
France
Benelux -1.53 (1.93) 0.11 (0.07) -25.78 (32.56) 8.55 (5.61) -1.71 (0.80) -28.02 (13.15)
Switzerland -2.43 (3.16) -0.01 (0.00) -12.40 (16.17) 15.50 (9.34) -2.87 (1.53) -104.54 (55.59)
Germany -0.98 (0.44) 0.15 (0.10) -19.97 (9.00) 13.17 (8.28) -0.94 (0.42) -27.19 (12.03)
Spain -1.91 (0.65) 0.06 (0.04) -15.77(5.40) 12.13 (7.59) -1.75 (0.80) -31.04 (14.25)
Italy -1.09 (1.89) 0.09 (0.06) -30.03 (52.16) 6.59 (4.58) -1.52 (0.67) -25.76 (11.40)
Great Britain -1.18 (2.19) 1.10 (0.64) -13.79 (25.46) 14.51 (8.42) -1.72 (0.79) -30.81 (14.19)
United States -1.62 (0.56) 1.82 (0.93) -29.09 (10.14) 9.17 (4.66) -1.45 (0.66) -32.77 (14.98)
Portugal -3.16 (0.84) -0.81 (0.51) -41.73 (11.09) 13.96 (8.82) -2.72 (1.41) -77.87 (40.42)
Morocco -2.89 (1.35) -0.13 (0.08) -36.41 (17.00) 11.11 (6.77) -2.82 (1.44) -69.49 (35.62)
Tunisia -2.81 (1.32) -1.01 (0.72) -37.41 (17.61) 8.59 (6.10) -2.72 (1.43) -85.20 (44.63)
Austria -2.73 (2.01) -0.01 (0.01) -25.44 (18.74) 11.85 (7.21) -2.96 (1.56) -95.74 (50.36)
Poland -2.29 (0.04) -0.51 (0.32) -44.48 (0.83) 17.33 (10.78) -1.97 (0.85) -25.90 (11.20)
Sweden -2.06 (0.83) 0.21 (0.12) -34.11 (13.73) 11.25 (6.60) -2.01 (0.87) -26.16 (11.34)
Denmark -3.37 (0.91) -0.43 (0.27) -28.19 (7.59) 6.98 (4.32) -2.86 (1.54) -125.00 (67.38)
China -1.79 (0.54) 1.54 (0.76) -30.73 (9.35) 9.38 (4.61) -1.61 (0.73) -28.59 (12.95)
RoW -1.61 (2.71) -0.86 (0.55) -14.00 (23.58) 18.70 (11.93) -1.95 (0.84) -25.42 (10.95)
Norway
Austria -3.07 (0.86) 1.51 (0.78) -27.32 (7.60) 8.57 (4.41) -3.03 (0.88) -22.87 (6.65)
Belgium -2.79 (0.13) 2.62 (2.37) -28.26 (1.36) 4.70 (4.24) -2.17 (0.99) -27.01 (12.34)
Canada -3.14 (0.88) 0.35 (0.45) -15.16 (4.25) 2.33 (2.99) -2.81 (1.14) -22.20 (9.04)
Germany -1.69 (1.55) 0.24 (0.14) -43.01 (39.47) 5.22 (2.98) -1.94 (0.89) -30.79 (14.04)
Denmark -3.00 (1.57) 0.58 (0.33) -85.72 (44.90) 9.60 (5.52) -2.97 (1.61) -143.57 (77.86)
Spain -2.79 (0.27) 2.03 (2.39) -19.38 (1.84) 2.61 (3.08) -2.23 (0.95) -23.27 (9.85)
Finland -2.71 (1.18) 1.21 (0.63) -29.55 (12.89) 8.74 (4.55) -2.74 (1.12) -23.12 (9.47)
France -2.11 (0.88) -0.11 (0.07) -22.05 (9.20) 8.83 (5.97) -2.03 (0.94) -32.66 (15.07)
Great Britain -2.10 (0.93) -0.66 (0.42) -51.29 (22.66) 16.40 (10.27) -2.08 (0.91) -25.91 (11.35)
Italy -2.78 (0.28) 3.09 (2.67) -42.35 (4.27) 5.04 (4.35) -2.18 (0.93) -24.67 (10.54)
Netherlands -2.36 (1.62) -0.17 (0.11) -24.63 (16.94) 10.02 (6.31) -2.57 (1.08) -24.87 (10.44)
Poland -2.97 (0.80) -0.86 (0.51) -24.50 (6.56) 18.13 (10.70) -2.45 (1.30) -103.41 (54.75)
RoW -2.19 (0.62) 1.06 (0.58) -31.01 (8.74) 10.32 (5.64) -2.00 (0.79) -27.29 (10.78)
Sweden -2.94 (0.84) 0.94 (0.52) -25.94 (7.40) 9.25 (5.14) -2.66 (1.41) -105.98 (56.35)
Singapore -2.74 (0.55) 0.67 (0.36) -39.35 (7.97) 8.15 (4.44) -2.41 (0.90) -27.83 (10.43)
United States -2.19 (0.55) 1.07 (0.56) -36.72 (9.23) 9.38 (4.91) -1.94 (0.85) -26.35 (11.48)
Notes: We report the mean across firms and the standard deviation in parenthesis. fxn are per-period fixed
export costs; fmn are per-period fixed MNE costs; F xn are sunk export costs; and Fmn are sunk MNE costs.
RoW refers to the rest of the world, a weighted average among the remaining countries in the sample.
Observations are at the firm-destination-year level.
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Table E.7: The size of calibrated costs, by country.
as % of sales, for median firm in U.S. dollars, for median firm
fxn f
m
n F
x
n F
m
n f
x
n f
m
n F
x
n F
m
n
France
Benelux 15.09 8.71 0.00 2.40 2,818 230,473 0 63,629
Switzerland 24.51 11.84 0.00 6.10 641 33,279 0 17,150
Germany 12.11 6.32 0.06 1.67 4,319 99,775 22 26,360
Spain 12.72 9.59 0.02 3.24 7,693 144,395 11 48,768
Italy 15.80 9.15 0.00 2.19 1,375 242,682 0 57,994
Great Britain 16.58 12.03 0.00 3.03 1,186 13,930 0 3,503
United States 13.30 13.08 0.00 4.15 4,111 22,638 0 7,175
Portugal 14.17 10.40 0.00 5.45 10,552 71,844 0 37,651
Morocco 15.56 12.40 0.02 7.53 6,098 52,811 8 32,075
Tunisia 15.48 8.93 0.02 2.61 6,466 82,339 9 24,107
Austria 17.51 12.88 0.00 6.91 2,516 79,248 0 42,519
Poland 13.37 10.38 0.00 4.27 8,257 63,511 0 26,159
Sweden 14.67 10.29 0.00 6.97 4,126 78,653 0 53,248
Denmark 14.92 11.47 0.00 10.31 11,645 93,852 0 84,357
China 14.54 12.95 0.00 8.36 5,380 30,661 0 19,777
RoW 16.78 2.49 0.00 0.72 735 26,913 0 7,782
Norway
Austria 18.27 17.20 0.00 7.12 16,692 42,167 0 17,457
Belgium 16.11 14.15 0.00 4.41 14,354 223,242 0 69,587
Canada 18.83 11.99 0.02 62.59 17,744 65,864 21 343,909
Germany 18.65 13.95 0.00 11.62 2,862 120,806 0 100,606
Denmark 18.28 15.20 0.01 8.39 6,336 131,619 3 72,675
Spain 15.99 11.62 0.00 6.35 19,336 213,711 0 116,753
Finland 18.02 15.93 0.02 9.17 9,466 50,191 10 28,891
France 17.57 15.09 0.04 3.67 8,938 130,652 20 31,828
Great Britain 16.94 12.68 0.00 5.67 8,761 152,299 0 68,038
Italy 15.90 13.63 0.00 5.21 19,179 593,834 0 226,801
Netherlands 19.45 14.98 0.00 7.03 5,718 191,689 0 90,032
Poland 17.62 13.24 0.00 18.49 21,330 132,818 0 185,505
Sweden 19.07 15.81 0.00 10.88 6,871 65,530 0 45,103
Singapore 15.44 15.02 0.00 7.26 12,632 54,242 0 26,217
United States 17.58 15.35 0.00 11.61 19,631 119,927 0 90,765
RoW 16.81 15.06 0.00 10.66 11,171 89,324 0 63,235
Notes: fxn are per-period fixed export costs; fmn are per-period fixed MNE costs; F xn are sunk export costs;
and Fmn are sunk MNE costs. The fixed and sunk export (MNE) cost values are conditional means across
random draws, conditional on positive measure of exporters (MNEs). Median firm refers to the firm with
median export (MNE) sales in destination n. RoW refers to the rest of the world, a weighted average among
the remaining countries in the sample.
58
